The New Point of View on Pico´s and Kant´s Concept of Dignity.

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15220%2F22%3A73615380" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15220/22:73615380 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S1059-433720220000088003/full/html" target="_blank" >https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/S1059-433720220000088003/full/html</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S1059-433720220000088003" target="_blank" >10.1108/S1059-433720220000088003</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The New Point of View on Pico´s and Kant´s Concept of Dignity.

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophicalterm and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theoryand practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s conceptof dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional andrational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows thespiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignityis located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) orphysics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz alsoused the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this valueand used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as apersonality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used itin the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts),regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon.In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for thelaw, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities.There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was differentfrom Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially themoral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity.The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of itin different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, butin a different context.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The New Point of View on Pico´s and Kant´s Concept of Dignity.

Popis výsledku anglicky

This chapter presents two examples of misinterpretation of the philosophicalterm and historical concept of human dignity in contemporary legal theoryand practice. Current legal theories (R. Alexy) still introduce Pico’s conceptof dignity regarding the human personality and personal (volitional andrational) abilities. The term ‘dignity’ is marginal for Pico and shows thespiritual way to the status of the original Adam. Pico’s concept of dignityis located in the area of spirit (hyperphysics), not metaphysics (soul) orphysics (materials). Günter Dürig in his commentary to Grundgesetz alsoused the Kantian concept of human dignity. Dürig exaggerated this valueand used it also for the area of physics (to protect the human being as apersonality). For Kant, the term ‘dignity’ was also marginal, and he used itin the area of metaphysics (soul – especially the moral and rational parts),regarding transcendence for homo noumenon, not for homo phaenomenon.In general, it seems to be problematic to use the ideal of the dignity for thelaw, which regulates the social relations between concrete phenomenal personalities.There are parallels to Pico. The Kantian starting point was differentfrom Pico, because Kant stays in the area of metaphysics (especially themoral and rational parts). Both consider freedom as a condition of dignity.The concept of autonomy of will is significant for both, but each thinks of itin different ways. For both, human being can become master of oneself, butin a different context.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Human Dignity.

ISBN

978-1-80382-390-4

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

41-65

Počet stran knihy

192

Název nakladatele

Emerald Publishing Limited

Místo vydání

Bingley UK

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

—