The Problem of Philosophical Foundations of Human Dignity in Law

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15220%2F24%3A73627999" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15220/24:73627999 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://sciendo.com/de/article/10.2478/iclr-2024-0002" target="_blank" >https://sciendo.com/de/article/10.2478/iclr-2024-0002</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/iclr-2024-0002" target="_blank" >10.2478/iclr-2024-0002</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Problem of Philosophical Foundations of Human Dignity in Law

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

May human dignity be the basis of human rights? May human rights still bederived from human dignity if we also accept a non-hierarchical organization of law?Or are human rights and human dignity more of a moral character which needs to beconstantly justified? Is it not a paradox that human dignity, which is the basis of humanrights, may be associated not only with rights, but also simultaneously with obligations?We derive human rights from human dignity as the highest value. May we admit othervalues besides dignity and how shall we deal with responsibilities? Although the Kantianconcept of dignity as a philosophical historical concept is inconsistent with the modernunderstanding of dignity in law in many respects, we would still find in Immanuel Kanta concept of dignity consisting more in duties than in rights, due to the moral nature ofdignity and law according to him.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Problem of Philosophical Foundations of Human Dignity in Law

Popis výsledku anglicky

May human dignity be the basis of human rights? May human rights still bederived from human dignity if we also accept a non-hierarchical organization of law?Or are human rights and human dignity more of a moral character which needs to beconstantly justified? Is it not a paradox that human dignity, which is the basis of humanrights, may be associated not only with rights, but also simultaneously with obligations?We derive human rights from human dignity as the highest value. May we admit othervalues besides dignity and how shall we deal with responsibilities? Although the Kantianconcept of dignity as a philosophical historical concept is inconsistent with the modernunderstanding of dignity in law in many respects, we would still find in Immanuel Kanta concept of dignity consisting more in duties than in rights, due to the moral nature ofdignity and law according to him.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50501 - Law

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International and Comparative Law Review

ISSN

1213-8770

e-ISSN

2464-6601

Svazek periodika

24

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

33-51

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105001154977