Does EU market abuse regulation create sufficient deterrence from financial crimes in the form of insider dealing?: Using the example of Germany

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F18%3A43913707" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/18:43913707 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://pefnet.mendelu.cz/wcd/w-rek-pefnet/pefnet17_fin.pdf" target="_blank" >http://pefnet.mendelu.cz/wcd/w-rek-pefnet/pefnet17_fin.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Does EU market abuse regulation create sufficient deterrence from financial crimes in the form of insider dealing?: Using the example of Germany

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

EU regulators and legislators have introduced numerous new requirements after the financial crisis in 2008, such as the Market Abuse Regulation with the aim of reducing financial crime. The paper analyses financial crime cases in the form of insider dealing in Germany only, however the results are believed to be transferrable to other member states. Policy-makers may benefit from this work by gaining a better understanding as to whether the regulation sufficiently deters potential insiders. This shall be assessed by applying the expected utility function known from Economics of Crime concepts to insider dealing. The conviction rate/detection rate of insiders has been found to be low when comparing these to trade activities on the market. The results indicate that unless such insider dealing detection and conviction rates change significantly going forward, more severe sanctions on their own are not sufficient to deter abusers.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Does EU market abuse regulation create sufficient deterrence from financial crimes in the form of insider dealing?: Using the example of Germany

Popis výsledku anglicky

EU regulators and legislators have introduced numerous new requirements after the financial crisis in 2008, such as the Market Abuse Regulation with the aim of reducing financial crime. The paper analyses financial crime cases in the form of insider dealing in Germany only, however the results are believed to be transferrable to other member states. Policy-makers may benefit from this work by gaining a better understanding as to whether the regulation sufficiently deters potential insiders. This shall be assessed by applying the expected utility function known from Economics of Crime concepts to insider dealing. The conviction rate/detection rate of insiders has been found to be low when comparing these to trade activities on the market. The results indicate that unless such insider dealing detection and conviction rates change significantly going forward, more severe sanctions on their own are not sufficient to deter abusers.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50204 - Business and management

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

PEFnet 2017: Proceedings

ISBN

978-80-7509-555-8

ISSN

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e-ISSN

neuvedeno

Počet stran výsledku

8

Strana od-do

185-192

Název nakladatele

Mendelova univerzita v Brně

Místo vydání

Brno

Místo konání akce

Brno

Datum konání akce

30. 11. 2017

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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