The Creditreform Solvency Index (Bonitätsindex) as an Unregulated Economic Policy Instrument an Overview of Developments in Recent Years, with a Focus on the Post-Covid 19 Situation and Considerations for an Appropriate Regulatory Framework

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F23%3A43923802" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/23:43923802 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://refpress.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Keller_REF.pdf" target="_blank" >https://refpress.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Keller_REF.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Creditreform Solvency Index (Bonitätsindex) as an Unregulated Economic Policy Instrument an Overview of Developments in Recent Years, with a Focus on the Post-Covid 19 Situation and Considerations for an Appropriate Regulatory Framework

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The rapid recovery after the end of the Covid 19 pandemic also failed to materialize in spring 2022, as new concerns were already clouding the global economy in parallel with the decline in severe Covid 19 cases: the Ukraine war, bro- ken supply chains, China&apos;s isolation including its adherence to the zero Covid strategy, and inflation worries. As a result, the importance of risk-averse behavior in everyday economic life is increasing sharply and, consequently, so is the overall caution and distrust of counterparties. Credit reports, credit agencies providing them and the methods of &quot;decision intelligence&quot; are much in demand and at the same time the lack of any regulation in this area seems at least out of time, if not dangerous. The market leader Creditreform alone conducts two million annual credit analyses and it seems that these take place in a legal vacuum, although the consequences are felt daily by virtually every company operating in Germany: Banks refuse to apply for state subsidies for their customers from a Creditreform score of worse than &quot;300&quot;, suppliers no longer supply materials on account from &quot;300&quot;, clients no longer place orders from &quot;400&quot;. Those who have fallen to &quot;500&quot; can actually close down. Is this right, suitable, neces- sary and appropriate? What would a possibly necessary control have to look like? How should the assessment be justified? To what extent does the company concerned have veto rights? Or should it be left to Creditreform and the credit reporting oligopoly to decide who must leave the economy and who may stay - in other words, should credit agencies be allowed to pursue concrete economic policy? The following text tries to put light onto the subject matter in necessary detail and depth and seeks some initial solutions or at least a foundation for further (political) discussion to and on these questions.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Creditreform Solvency Index (Bonitätsindex) as an Unregulated Economic Policy Instrument an Overview of Developments in Recent Years, with a Focus on the Post-Covid 19 Situation and Considerations for an Appropriate Regulatory Framework

Popis výsledku anglicky

The rapid recovery after the end of the Covid 19 pandemic also failed to materialize in spring 2022, as new concerns were already clouding the global economy in parallel with the decline in severe Covid 19 cases: the Ukraine war, bro- ken supply chains, China&apos;s isolation including its adherence to the zero Covid strategy, and inflation worries. As a result, the importance of risk-averse behavior in everyday economic life is increasing sharply and, consequently, so is the overall caution and distrust of counterparties. Credit reports, credit agencies providing them and the methods of &quot;decision intelligence&quot; are much in demand and at the same time the lack of any regulation in this area seems at least out of time, if not dangerous. The market leader Creditreform alone conducts two million annual credit analyses and it seems that these take place in a legal vacuum, although the consequences are felt daily by virtually every company operating in Germany: Banks refuse to apply for state subsidies for their customers from a Creditreform score of worse than &quot;300&quot;, suppliers no longer supply materials on account from &quot;300&quot;, clients no longer place orders from &quot;400&quot;. Those who have fallen to &quot;500&quot; can actually close down. Is this right, suitable, neces- sary and appropriate? What would a possibly necessary control have to look like? How should the assessment be justified? To what extent does the company concerned have veto rights? Or should it be left to Creditreform and the credit reporting oligopoly to decide who must leave the economy and who may stay - in other words, should credit agencies be allowed to pursue concrete economic policy? The following text tries to put light onto the subject matter in necessary detail and depth and seeks some initial solutions or at least a foundation for further (political) discussion to and on these questions.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50206 - Finance

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Review of Economics and Finance

ISSN

1923-7529

e-ISSN

1923-8401

Svazek periodika

21

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2023

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

10

Strana od-do

804-813

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85169804949