Why Uzbekistan pays premium prices for sugar: Institutional and market analysis

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F25%3A43928369" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/25:43928369 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.24263/2304-974X-2025-14-4-14" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.24263/2304-974X-2025-14-4-14</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.24263/2304-974X-2025-14-4-14" target="_blank" >10.24263/2304-974X-2025-14-4-14</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Why Uzbekistan pays premium prices for sugar: Institutional and market analysis

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Introduction. Among the fifteen largest global sugar importers by value, only three countries pay average prices exceeding $700 per ton: the United States ($761), Italy ($709), and Uzbekistan ($706). The first two countries implement extensive programs to protect domestic production. Uzbekistan produces virtually no sugar. This study examines how a country with nothing to protect pays prices comparable to protectionist economies. Materials and methods. This study analyses data on sugar imports classified under the Harmonised System code HS1701 for the period 2017-2024, obtained from two main sources: the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) and the International Trade Centre Trade Map (ITC Trade Map). The study employs comparative price analysis across three dimensions-time, cross-country, and supplier-specific-in combination with natural experiment designs and a counterfactual welfare estimator. Results and discussion. Using HS1701 import data from 2017 to 2024 for Central Asian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, we identify systemic procurement inefficiencies. Uzbekistan pays 17.4% more than Kazakhstan, 8.8% more than Tajikistan, and 7.9% more than Kyrgyzstan, despite importing more sugar than all regional competitors combined. Natural experiment comparisons separate institutional from geographic factors: Kyrgyzstan (EAEU member, similar geography) and Tajikistan (non-member, worse geography) both achieve better prices, ruling out location as the cause. For Brazilian sugar-where no preferential agreements apply-Uzbekistan pays a 39.6% premium over Kazakhstan, confirming procurement inefficiency independent of EAEU effects. Estimated welfare losses reach $67-117 million annually (0.06-0.10% of GDP), totalling $362 million in 2021-2024. Conclusions. The study makes three contributions. First, it shows that institutions can outweigh geography: Tajikistan&apos;s lower prices despite worse location challenge the idea that landlockedness alone drives trade costs. Second, it quantifies the EAEU exclusion penalty (12.1%) while proving domestic factors matter-non-members like Tajikistan and Azerbaijan match EAEU prices. Third, it overturns bargaining theory: despite importing more sugar than all neighbours combined, Uzbekistan pays the highest prices. This inverse volume-price relationship reveals that institutional weaknesses can erase the benefits of scale.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Why Uzbekistan pays premium prices for sugar: Institutional and market analysis

Popis výsledku anglicky

Introduction. Among the fifteen largest global sugar importers by value, only three countries pay average prices exceeding $700 per ton: the United States ($761), Italy ($709), and Uzbekistan ($706). The first two countries implement extensive programs to protect domestic production. Uzbekistan produces virtually no sugar. This study examines how a country with nothing to protect pays prices comparable to protectionist economies. Materials and methods. This study analyses data on sugar imports classified under the Harmonised System code HS1701 for the period 2017-2024, obtained from two main sources: the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) and the International Trade Centre Trade Map (ITC Trade Map). The study employs comparative price analysis across three dimensions-time, cross-country, and supplier-specific-in combination with natural experiment designs and a counterfactual welfare estimator. Results and discussion. Using HS1701 import data from 2017 to 2024 for Central Asian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, we identify systemic procurement inefficiencies. Uzbekistan pays 17.4% more than Kazakhstan, 8.8% more than Tajikistan, and 7.9% more than Kyrgyzstan, despite importing more sugar than all regional competitors combined. Natural experiment comparisons separate institutional from geographic factors: Kyrgyzstan (EAEU member, similar geography) and Tajikistan (non-member, worse geography) both achieve better prices, ruling out location as the cause. For Brazilian sugar-where no preferential agreements apply-Uzbekistan pays a 39.6% premium over Kazakhstan, confirming procurement inefficiency independent of EAEU effects. Estimated welfare losses reach $67-117 million annually (0.06-0.10% of GDP), totalling $362 million in 2021-2024. Conclusions. The study makes three contributions. First, it shows that institutions can outweigh geography: Tajikistan&apos;s lower prices despite worse location challenge the idea that landlockedness alone drives trade costs. Second, it quantifies the EAEU exclusion penalty (12.1%) while proving domestic factors matter-non-members like Tajikistan and Azerbaijan match EAEU prices. Third, it overturns bargaining theory: despite importing more sugar than all neighbours combined, Uzbekistan pays the highest prices. This inverse volume-price relationship reveals that institutional weaknesses can erase the benefits of scale.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

40500 - Other agricultural sciences

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ukrainian Food Journal

ISSN

2304-974X

e-ISSN

2313-5891

Svazek periodika

14

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

UA - Ukrajina

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

792-812

Kód UT WoS článku

001678194500012

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105030693612