In what Sense is Tarski's Semantic Conception of Truth Semantic?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F10%3A10067190" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/10:10067190 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

In what Sense is Tarski's Semantic Conception of Truth Semantic?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A view is widely held among semanticists and informed philosophers that Tarski co-founded formal semantics by showing us how to construct truth definitions for 1st order languages, thereby providing the very first formal semantics. However, several critics - J. Etchemendy, H. Putnam and S. Soames among others - argued that this view is based on a confusion. This chapter aims to show in what respect they are right, while arguing that we should not buy their claims to the effect that Tarski's method of truth definition has no semantic import. Having introduced the essential conceptual and technical underpinnings of Tarski's method, we argue that when various aspects of Tarski's method are distinguished and properly understood, its contribution to semantics dwells in the fact that recursive definitions can be formalized as axiomatic truth-theories with semantic terms as theoretical primitives, which shed light on the compositional structure of a language for which they are formulated.

Název v anglickém jazyce

In what Sense is Tarski's Semantic Conception of Truth Semantic?

Popis výsledku anglicky

A view is widely held among semanticists and informed philosophers that Tarski co-founded formal semantics by showing us how to construct truth definitions for 1st order languages, thereby providing the very first formal semantics. However, several critics - J. Etchemendy, H. Putnam and S. Soames among others - argued that this view is based on a confusion. This chapter aims to show in what respect they are right, while arguing that we should not buy their claims to the effect that Tarski's method of truth definition has no semantic import. Having introduced the essential conceptual and technical underpinnings of Tarski's method, we argue that when various aspects of Tarski's method are distinguished and properly understood, its contribution to semantics dwells in the fact that recursive definitions can be formalized as axiomatic truth-theories with semantic terms as theoretical primitives, which shed light on the compositional structure of a language for which they are formulated.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP401%2F10%2F0146" target="_blank" >GAP401/10/0146: Ćlověk jako normativní tvor</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2010

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

An anthology of philosophical studies

ISBN

978-960-6672-65-1

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

153-166

Počet stran knihy

240

Název nakladatele

Atiner

Místo vydání

Athény

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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