The Role of the “Private” in Inter-gender Misunderstanding

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F17%3A50013407" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/17:50013407 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Role of the “Private” in Inter-gender Misunderstanding

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, I use Wittgenstein’s private language argument for reflecting on some folk-linguistic misconceptions. In Section 1, I show that elements of the private language semantics inform common ways of looking at some situations referred to as “misunderstandings”. I suggest that it would be appropriate to conceive of the alleged misunderstandings as practical attitudes of mistreatment. This suggestion is explored in Section 2, which is devoted to a commonly assumed prominent example of the problem: the so-called inter-gender misunderstanding. It is believed that men and women use language in systematically different ways, as a result of which they do not understand each other properly, because they miss what their interlocutors “mean”. The conceptual apparatus of mentalist semantics presumed here is abused in order to advocate morally reprehensible actions against women. In Section 3, I suggest that the Wittgensteinian accounts of language and mind offer arguments for denying private conceptions of understanding on the grounds of both philosophy of language and ethics.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Role of the “Private” in Inter-gender Misunderstanding

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, I use Wittgenstein’s private language argument for reflecting on some folk-linguistic misconceptions. In Section 1, I show that elements of the private language semantics inform common ways of looking at some situations referred to as “misunderstandings”. I suggest that it would be appropriate to conceive of the alleged misunderstandings as practical attitudes of mistreatment. This suggestion is explored in Section 2, which is devoted to a commonly assumed prominent example of the problem: the so-called inter-gender misunderstanding. It is believed that men and women use language in systematically different ways, as a result of which they do not understand each other properly, because they miss what their interlocutors “mean”. The conceptual apparatus of mentalist semantics presumed here is abused in order to advocate morally reprehensible actions against women. In Section 3, I suggest that the Wittgensteinian accounts of language and mind offer arguments for denying private conceptions of understanding on the grounds of both philosophy of language and ethics.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Organon F : filozofický časopis

ISSN

1335-0668

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

24

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

142-165

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85023206478