Epistemological Naturalness: What is a Good Heuristic Strategy Good For?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F18%3A50014296" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/18:50014296 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LLP/article/view/LLP.2017.003" target="_blank" >http://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/LLP/article/view/LLP.2017.003</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/LLP.2017.003" target="_blank" >10.12775/LLP.2017.003</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Epistemological Naturalness: What is a Good Heuristic Strategy Good For?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

According to the standard interpretation of Lewis’s theory of predicate meaning (the U&amp;N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically - as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&amp;N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically - as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&amp;N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&amp;N theory can be used as a good heuristic for delivering the correct verdicts when doing applied semantics, i.e., when we try to determine the best meaning candidate for a particular predicate. In this paper, I try to show that the “good heuristic strategy” is of no use because A) there is no guarantee that the epistemological and the metaphysical criteria of naturalness deliver the same verdicts and B) even if they deliver the same verdicts, the difference in their theoretical backgrounds may affect arguments which rely on the verdicts. The difference will be shown by drawing on the example of Theodore Sider and his use of the U&amp;N theory.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Epistemological Naturalness: What is a Good Heuristic Strategy Good For?

Popis výsledku anglicky

According to the standard interpretation of Lewis’s theory of predicate meaning (the U&amp;N theory), the naturalness of meaning candidates should be stated metaphysically - as a length of definition in terms of fundamental properties. Recently, Weatherson has criticized the U&amp;N theory and argued that the criterion of naturalness should be stated epistemologically - as the amount of evidence needed to form a belief. Despite the criticism, his attitude towards the U&amp;N theory is quite relaxed. According to Weatherson, the U&amp;N theory can be used as a good heuristic for delivering the correct verdicts when doing applied semantics, i.e., when we try to determine the best meaning candidate for a particular predicate. In this paper, I try to show that the “good heuristic strategy” is of no use because A) there is no guarantee that the epistemological and the metaphysical criteria of naturalness deliver the same verdicts and B) even if they deliver the same verdicts, the difference in their theoretical backgrounds may affect arguments which rely on the verdicts. The difference will be shown by drawing on the example of Theodore Sider and his use of the U&amp;N theory.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Logic and logical philosophy

ISSN

1425-3305

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

27

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

PL - Polská republika

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

85-104

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85044004741