Inferentialism on Meaning, Content, and Context

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50016518" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50016518 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00394-0" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00394-0</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00394-0" target="_blank" >10.1007/s12136-019-00394-0</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Inferentialism on Meaning, Content, and Context

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Inferentialism on Meaning, Content, and Context

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, I show how normative inferentialism could be used to explain several phenomena related to natural languages. First, I show how the distinction between the inferential potential and the inferential significance fits the standard distinction between the meaning of a sentence and the content of an utterance. Second, I show how the distinction could be used to explain ambiguity and free pragmatic enrichment from the perspective of normative inferentialism. The aim of this paper is to establish theoretical foundations that enable normative inferentialism to enter the discussions within the literalism-contextualism debate. As I argue, the biggest advantage of inferentialism is that it provides one general framework for the representation of meaning/content that naturally incorporates contextual information and so it can be used to represent meanings of various types of context-dependent sentences.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta Analytica

ISSN

0353-5150

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

35

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

35-50

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85068961781