Collective Belief and the Intentional Strategy

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50016624" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50016624 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://filosofiednes.ff.uhk.cz/index.php/hen/article/view/303" target="_blank" >https://filosofiednes.ff.uhk.cz/index.php/hen/article/view/303</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.26806/fd.v11i2.303" target="_blank" >10.26806/fd.v11i2.303</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Collective Belief and the Intentional Strategy

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

What do we mean when we say that some group believes something? Do we simply mean that all the members of the group believe it, or are we acknowledging the existence of some kind of group agent? According to Margaret Gilbert, talk about group mental states refers to the specific kind of agreements she calls joint commitments — that is, to collectively believe something means to be committed with others to believe it. In my article, I will first present Gilbert’s approach in more detail but will ultimately show that this approach is problematic and will refute it. I will briefly consider the most common solution to the problems Gilbert’s account faces, which lies in replacing collective beliefs with acceptances, but I will show that this solution will not do either. The solution I will then present will be based on Daniel Dennett’s intentional strategy, which is a method of interpreting the things around us and predicting their behaviour by treating them as rational agents with relevant intentions. I will try to show that all the problematic cases of collective belief can be explained by applying the intentional strategy to the groups in question.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Collective Belief and the Intentional Strategy

Popis výsledku anglicky

What do we mean when we say that some group believes something? Do we simply mean that all the members of the group believe it, or are we acknowledging the existence of some kind of group agent? According to Margaret Gilbert, talk about group mental states refers to the specific kind of agreements she calls joint commitments — that is, to collectively believe something means to be committed with others to believe it. In my article, I will first present Gilbert’s approach in more detail but will ultimately show that this approach is problematic and will refute it. I will briefly consider the most common solution to the problems Gilbert’s account faces, which lies in replacing collective beliefs with acceptances, but I will show that this solution will not do either. The solution I will then present will be based on Daniel Dennett’s intentional strategy, which is a method of interpreting the things around us and predicting their behaviour by treating them as rational agents with relevant intentions. I will try to show that all the problematic cases of collective belief can be explained by applying the intentional strategy to the groups in question.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferencializmus a kolektivní intencionalita</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Filosofie dnes

ISSN

1804-0969

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

11

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

57-75

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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