Vše

Co hledáte?

Vše
Projekty
Výsledky výzkumu
Subjekty

Rychlé hledání

  • Projekty podpořené TA ČR
  • Významné projekty
  • Projekty s nejvyšší státní podporou
  • Aktuálně běžící projekty

Chytré vyhledávání

  • Takto najdu konkrétní +slovo
  • Takto z výsledků -slovo zcela vynechám
  • “Takto můžu najít celou frázi”

Chemical weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: a threat analysis

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50016770" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50016770 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6" target="_blank" >10.1016/B978-0-12-819090-6.00007-6</a>

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Chemical weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: a threat analysis

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States, the high risk of possible attacks with chemical weapons (CWs), especially by groups linked to jihadist terrorism, has been perceived. Before 9/11, in 1994 and 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious organization in Japan, used sarin (a nerve agent) in attacks in Matsumoto and on the Tokyo subway, causing a large number of casualties. These terrorist attacks had a large impact on the international chemical defense and intelligence communities, but not on other circles, perhaps because a chemical attack by a religious organization in Japan seemed something far removed from the reality of the rest of the world. But this changed after 9/11, when the mailing of letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores accompanied by images of the attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center towers increased the concern about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks, including attacks with CWs. In this chapter, information is analyzed from open sources regarding the possible use of CWs by terrorist groups, especially by those affiliated with the jihadist terrorism network. As religious terrorist groups, Al Qaeda and Daesh do not fit the assumption made by Brian Jenkins in 1975 that “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins, 1975). This statement fits better with secular terrorist groups. But for religious terrorist groups, “divine duty” results in disappearance of moral restraints that would justify “a lot of people dead” in their terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 attacks. And if CWs are part of the WMD concept because they can cause a large number of casualties, they could be very good tools for jihadist terrorist groups to achieve their goals.

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Chemical weapons of mass destruction and terrorism: a threat analysis

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    After the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks in the United States, the high risk of possible attacks with chemical weapons (CWs), especially by groups linked to jihadist terrorism, has been perceived. Before 9/11, in 1994 and 1995, Aum Shinrikyo, a religious organization in Japan, used sarin (a nerve agent) in attacks in Matsumoto and on the Tokyo subway, causing a large number of casualties. These terrorist attacks had a large impact on the international chemical defense and intelligence communities, but not on other circles, perhaps because a chemical attack by a religious organization in Japan seemed something far removed from the reality of the rest of the world. But this changed after 9/11, when the mailing of letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores accompanied by images of the attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center towers increased the concern about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attacks, including attacks with CWs. In this chapter, information is analyzed from open sources regarding the possible use of CWs by terrorist groups, especially by those affiliated with the jihadist terrorism network. As religious terrorist groups, Al Qaeda and Daesh do not fit the assumption made by Brian Jenkins in 1975 that “terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins, 1975). This statement fits better with secular terrorist groups. But for religious terrorist groups, “divine duty” results in disappearance of moral restraints that would justify “a lot of people dead” in their terrorist attacks, such as the 9/11 attacks. And if CWs are part of the WMD concept because they can cause a large number of casualties, they could be very good tools for jihadist terrorist groups to achieve their goals.

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    C - Kapitola v odborné knize

  • CEP obor

  • OECD FORD obor

    50601 - Political science

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

  • Návaznosti

    I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2020

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku

  • Název knihy nebo sborníku

    Handbook of Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents

  • ISBN

    978-0-12-819090-6

  • Počet stran výsledku

    16

  • Strana od-do

    79-94

  • Počet stran knihy

    1318

  • Název nakladatele

    Elsevier

  • Místo vydání

    Oxford

  • Kód UT WoS kapitoly