Who Makes a Compromise? Adopting Pledges in Czech Coalition Agreements

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50016943" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50016943 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-review/article/who-makes-a-compromise-adopting-pledges-in-czech-coalition-agreements/75D0642480A7A41F0E101A2C12DDD3EC" target="_blank" >https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-review/article/who-makes-a-compromise-adopting-pledges-in-czech-coalition-agreements/75D0642480A7A41F0E101A2C12DDD3EC</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1062798720000204" target="_blank" >10.1017/S1062798720000204</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Who Makes a Compromise? Adopting Pledges in Czech Coalition Agreements

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Translating party pledges into coalition agreements is a crucial goal of after-election coalition negotiations. Full adoption is the best result for the bargaining party, while limited adoption is a kind of compromise forced by coalition partners, and non-adoption can be seen as a defeat. The question of what undermines the compromise and defeat in coalition agreements is, however, rarely answered. This article formulates hypotheses concerning the effect of consensual pledges among coalition parties, and party and voter-issue salience on parties’ ability to adopt their pledges and adopt them fully or partially. The effect of party level characteristics is considered. The analysis is provided on a new dataset of narrow Czech coalition party pledges in three governments established after elections in 2006, 2010 and 2013. Multinomial logit regression is used for the statistical analysis.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Who Makes a Compromise? Adopting Pledges in Czech Coalition Agreements

Popis výsledku anglicky

Translating party pledges into coalition agreements is a crucial goal of after-election coalition negotiations. Full adoption is the best result for the bargaining party, while limited adoption is a kind of compromise forced by coalition partners, and non-adoption can be seen as a defeat. The question of what undermines the compromise and defeat in coalition agreements is, however, rarely answered. This article formulates hypotheses concerning the effect of consensual pledges among coalition parties, and party and voter-issue salience on parties’ ability to adopt their pledges and adopt them fully or partially. The effect of party level characteristics is considered. The analysis is provided on a new dataset of narrow Czech coalition party pledges in three governments established after elections in 2006, 2010 and 2013. Multinomial logit regression is used for the statistical analysis.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Review

ISSN

1062-7987

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

28

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

728-743

Kód UT WoS článku

000564843000002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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