The Proscription Paradox: Banning Parties Based on Threshold Requirements and Electoral Volatility in Latin America

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F23%3A50020141" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/23:50020141 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.37" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.37</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/lap.2022.37" target="_blank" >10.1017/lap.2022.37</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Proscription Paradox: Banning Parties Based on Threshold Requirements and Electoral Volatility in Latin America

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Banning political parties is an extreme institutional measure that democracies tend to use sparingly. Nevertheless, Latin American countries frequently proscribe their parties through rules that activate dissolution for not reaching a certain number of votes or seats in an election. Such rules are expected to stabilize and simplify party systems. However, a competing theory suggests that such rules instead promote electoral volatility by injecting political uncertainty into the party system through cyclical refoundation of extinct parties and the mechanical effects of parties’ exits. Attempting to resolve this paradox, this analysis tests the effect of dissolution thresholds on electoral volatility in all Latin American democratic elections since 1980. Party bans based on dissolution thresholds are found to promote electoral volatility, which bears implications for democratic governance.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Proscription Paradox: Banning Parties Based on Threshold Requirements and Electoral Volatility in Latin America

Popis výsledku anglicky

Banning political parties is an extreme institutional measure that democracies tend to use sparingly. Nevertheless, Latin American countries frequently proscribe their parties through rules that activate dissolution for not reaching a certain number of votes or seats in an election. Such rules are expected to stabilize and simplify party systems. However, a competing theory suggests that such rules instead promote electoral volatility by injecting political uncertainty into the party system through cyclical refoundation of extinct parties and the mechanical effects of parties’ exits. Attempting to resolve this paradox, this analysis tests the effect of dissolution thresholds on electoral volatility in all Latin American democratic elections since 1980. Party bans based on dissolution thresholds are found to promote electoral volatility, which bears implications for democratic governance.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Latin American Politics and Society

ISSN

1531-426X

e-ISSN

1548-2456

Svazek periodika

65

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

31-54

Kód UT WoS článku

000919325100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85159579395