Democratizing urban governance through mayoral term limits: Quasi-experimental evidence from a reform in Chilean municipalities

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F23%3A50020794" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/23:50020794 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11210/23:10466314

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2023.104446" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2023.104446</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2023.104446" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.cities.2023.104446</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Democratizing urban governance through mayoral term limits: Quasi-experimental evidence from a reform in Chilean municipalities

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Term limits on elected mayors are often advocated because they eliminate the incumbency advantage and promote higher representativeness and citizen participation through a more open and reinvigorated electoral competition in local governments. We examine whether key dimensions of local democracy (election competitiveness, turnout, invalid voting, descriptive representation of women) are affected by the imposition of term limits. This article uses a quasi-experimental technique (difference-in-differences design) which leverages a unique and rare institutional reform in Chile that exogenously imposed term limits on some - but not all - mayors in 2020. The as-good-as random assignment of municipalities to either group allows to exploit comparisons which yield robust causal estimates. The overall contribution of term limits to local democracy has been positive because they promote electoral competition, the emergence of female candidates and voter participation, as well as reduce invalid voting rates.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Democratizing urban governance through mayoral term limits: Quasi-experimental evidence from a reform in Chilean municipalities

Popis výsledku anglicky

Term limits on elected mayors are often advocated because they eliminate the incumbency advantage and promote higher representativeness and citizen participation through a more open and reinvigorated electoral competition in local governments. We examine whether key dimensions of local democracy (election competitiveness, turnout, invalid voting, descriptive representation of women) are affected by the imposition of term limits. This article uses a quasi-experimental technique (difference-in-differences design) which leverages a unique and rare institutional reform in Chile that exogenously imposed term limits on some - but not all - mayors in 2020. The as-good-as random assignment of municipalities to either group allows to exploit comparisons which yield robust causal estimates. The overall contribution of term limits to local democracy has been positive because they promote electoral competition, the emergence of female candidates and voter participation, as well as reduce invalid voting rates.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-02098S" target="_blank" >GA20-02098S: Politická soutěž a lokální demokracie v komparativní perspektivě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Cities

ISSN

0264-2751

e-ISSN

1873-6084

Svazek periodika

140

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

September

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

"Article number: 104446"

Kód UT WoS článku

001028335400001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85163157776