Davidson and Sellars on Animal Minds: Rationality and Normativity

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F25%3A50022621" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/25:50022621 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003485223-13" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003485223-13</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003485223-13" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003485223-13</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Davidson and Sellars on Animal Minds: Rationality and Normativity

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

An overriding aim of Davidson and Sellars is to find an appropriate place for human beings in what Sellars calls the scientific image of the world. An illuminating way in which they do so is to distinguish us from other animals on the assumption that we but not they are lingual. They agree that in its rational and normative character, the use of language goes a long way in defining what it is to have a mind. At this point, they part company. Davidson contends that rationality is presupposed by an interpretation of behavior which grounds the attribution of propositionally contentful mental states to other humans when they speak/gesture. He is deeply skeptical that animal behavior can be so interpreted. Sellars contends that rationality should not be associated with such states but with a capacity to use logic which other animals lack. That is, he is willing to attribute a degree of rationality, and with it mind, to other animals in a way that Davidson is not. The thesis of this essay is that both philosophers suggest ways in which the attribution of mindedness (and perhaps rationality) to alingual animals can be justified.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Davidson and Sellars on Animal Minds: Rationality and Normativity

Popis výsledku anglicky

An overriding aim of Davidson and Sellars is to find an appropriate place for human beings in what Sellars calls the scientific image of the world. An illuminating way in which they do so is to distinguish us from other animals on the assumption that we but not they are lingual. They agree that in its rational and normative character, the use of language goes a long way in defining what it is to have a mind. At this point, they part company. Davidson contends that rationality is presupposed by an interpretation of behavior which grounds the attribution of propositionally contentful mental states to other humans when they speak/gesture. He is deeply skeptical that animal behavior can be so interpreted. Sellars contends that rationality should not be associated with such states but with a capacity to use logic which other animals lack. That is, he is willing to attribute a degree of rationality, and with it mind, to other animals in a way that Davidson is not. The thesis of this essay is that both philosophers suggest ways in which the attribution of mindedness (and perhaps rationality) to alingual animals can be justified.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Sellars and Davidson in Dialogue: Truths, Meanings, and Minds

ISBN

978-1-00-348522-3

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

247-266

Počet stran knihy

332

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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