GOGAR and Logical Theories

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F25%3A50022856" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/25:50022856 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197745083.003.0006" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197745083.003.0006</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197745083.003.0006" target="_blank" >10.1093/oso/9780197745083.003.0006</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

GOGAR and Logical Theories

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

There is a clear sense in which logic is a theory of GOGAR – logical laws articulateits most general principles. But what is the exact relationship between logical theory and thepractices of giving and asking for reasons or drawing inferences? The usual picture is thatpeople play GOGAR and logicians supervise what they do: confirm that some of theinferences that constitute the moves of the game are correct while pointing out that othersare incorrect. To do this, logicians need some authority, which would underpin theirarbitration of what is correct. Where does this authority come from? The usual answer isthat it comes from the fact that logical laws bring to light some fixed structures of eitherhuman mind or the natural world. What I claim is that the ultimate source of the authoritycomes from the argumentative practices themselves – viz. from the norms inherent to them,which logic brings to light (and neatens). Thus it is not so that logic rectifies GOGAR on thebasis of an authority acquired elsewhere, but rather that logic pinpoints the norms implicit inGOGAR to state the most general rules of the game in an explicit form.

Název v anglickém jazyce

GOGAR and Logical Theories

Popis výsledku anglicky

There is a clear sense in which logic is a theory of GOGAR – logical laws articulateits most general principles. But what is the exact relationship between logical theory and thepractices of giving and asking for reasons or drawing inferences? The usual picture is thatpeople play GOGAR and logicians supervise what they do: confirm that some of theinferences that constitute the moves of the game are correct while pointing out that othersare incorrect. To do this, logicians need some authority, which would underpin theirarbitration of what is correct. Where does this authority come from? The usual answer isthat it comes from the fact that logical laws bring to light some fixed structures of eitherhuman mind or the natural world. What I claim is that the ultimate source of the authoritycomes from the argumentative practices themselves – viz. from the norms inherent to them,which logic brings to light (and neatens). Thus it is not so that logic rectifies GOGAR on thebasis of an authority acquired elsewhere, but rather that logic pinpoints the norms implicit inGOGAR to state the most general rules of the game in an explicit form.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Why and How We Give and Ask for Reasons: Perspectives from Philosophy and the Sciences

ISBN

978-0-19-774511-3

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

124-137

Počet stran knihy

356

Název nakladatele

Oxford university press

Místo vydání

Oxford

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

—