In defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic: drawing conclusions from natural language

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985556%3A_____%2F21%3A00520340" target="_blank" >RIV/67985556:_____/21:00520340 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02399-z" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02399-z</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02399-z" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-019-02399-z</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

In defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic: drawing conclusions from natural language

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Plural Logic is an extension of First-Order Logic which has, as well as singular terms and quantifiers, their plural counterparts. Analogously, Higher-Level Plural Logic is an extension of Plural Logic which has, as well as plural terms and quantifiers, higher-level plural ones. Roughly speaking, higher-level plurals stand to plurals like plurals stand to singulars, they are pluralised plurals. Allegedly, Higher-Level Plural Logic enjoys the expressive power of a simple type theory while committing us to nothing more than the austere ontology of First-Order Logic. Were this true, Higher-Level Plural Logic would be a useful tool, with various applications in philosophy and linguistics. However, while the notions of plural reference and quantification enjoy widespread acceptance today, their higher-level counterparts have been received with a lot of scepticism. In this paper, I argue for the legitimacy of Higher-Level Plural Logic by providing evidence to the effect that natural languages contain higher-level plural expressions and showing that it is likely that they do so in an indispensable manner. Since the arguments I put forward are of the same sort advocates of Plural Logic have employed to defend their position, I conclude that the commonly held view that Plural Logic is legitimate, but not so its higher-level plural extensions is untenable.

Název v anglickém jazyce

In defence of Higher-Level Plural Logic: drawing conclusions from natural language

Popis výsledku anglicky

Plural Logic is an extension of First-Order Logic which has, as well as singular terms and quantifiers, their plural counterparts. Analogously, Higher-Level Plural Logic is an extension of Plural Logic which has, as well as plural terms and quantifiers, higher-level plural ones. Roughly speaking, higher-level plurals stand to plurals like plurals stand to singulars, they are pluralised plurals. Allegedly, Higher-Level Plural Logic enjoys the expressive power of a simple type theory while committing us to nothing more than the austere ontology of First-Order Logic. Were this true, Higher-Level Plural Logic would be a useful tool, with various applications in philosophy and linguistics. However, while the notions of plural reference and quantification enjoy widespread acceptance today, their higher-level counterparts have been received with a lot of scepticism. In this paper, I argue for the legitimacy of Higher-Level Plural Logic by providing evidence to the effect that natural languages contain higher-level plural expressions and showing that it is likely that they do so in an indispensable manner. Since the arguments I put forward are of the same sort advocates of Plural Logic have employed to defend their position, I conclude that the commonly held view that Plural Logic is legitimate, but not so its higher-level plural extensions is untenable.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10102 - Applied mathematics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA18-00113S" target="_blank" >GA18-00113S: Usuzování se stupňovanými vlastnostmi</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Synthese

ISSN

0039-7857

e-ISSN

1573-0964

Svazek periodika

198

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

6

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

5253-5280

Kód UT WoS článku

000657791400015

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85074008660