The Synthesis of of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F10%3A00351765" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/10:00351765 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Synthesis of of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This essay argues that Berkeley's doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke's conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley's views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley's doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found inDescartes? later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying thisat least in the case of theconcepts of self, causation, substance, and virtueBerkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Synthesis of of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions

Popis výsledku anglicky

This essay argues that Berkeley's doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke's conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley's views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley's doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found inDescartes? later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying thisat least in the case of theconcepts of self, causation, substance, and virtueBerkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP401%2F10%2F1504" target="_blank" >GAP401/10/1504: Formální a historický přístup k epistemologii</a><br>

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2010

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Berkeley Studies

ISSN

1947-3737

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

21

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

21

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

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Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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