Inferentialism and Normativity

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F13%3A00394193" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/13:00394193 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Inferentialism and Normativity

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Inferentialism can be characterized as the conviction that to be meaningful, in the distinctively human way, or to possess 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The rationale for articulating inferentialism as afully-fledged philosophical position is to emphasize its distinctness from the more traditional representationalism. Inferentialism is closely connected with the conviction that any kind of human meaning is essentially, in Sellars's often quoted words, "fraught with ought". It follows that when describing phenomena that have to do with meaning (language, mind etc.) we cannot make do with the language of natural science. This is not because some additional concepts are lacking, but because claims concerning meaning are often not indicative claims.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Inferentialism and Normativity

Popis výsledku anglicky

Inferentialism can be characterized as the conviction that to be meaningful, in the distinctively human way, or to possess 'conceptual content', is to be governed by a certain kind of inferential rules. The rationale for articulating inferentialism as afully-fledged philosophical position is to emphasize its distinctness from the more traditional representationalism. Inferentialism is closely connected with the conviction that any kind of human meaning is essentially, in Sellars's often quoted words, "fraught with ought". It follows that when describing phenomena that have to do with meaning (language, mind etc.) we cannot make do with the language of natural science. This is not because some additional concepts are lacking, but because claims concerning meaning are often not indicative claims.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP401%2F10%2F0146" target="_blank" >GAP401/10/0146: Ćlověk jako normativní tvor</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Analytic Philosophy

ISBN

978-0-19-923884-2

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

1082-1097

Počet stran knihy

1161

Název nakladatele

Oxford University Press

Místo vydání

Oxford

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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