Consciousness of Judging. Katkov’s Critique of Marty’s State of Affairs and Brentano’s Description of Judgement

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F17%3A00481733" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/17:00481733 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-011" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-011</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-011" target="_blank" >10.1515/9783110531480-011</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Consciousness of Judging. Katkov’s Critique of Marty’s State of Affairs and Brentano’s Description of Judgement

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This study presents Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of meaning and Brentano’s description of judgemental consciousness. Katkov, a student of Oskar Kraus in Prague, developed an interesting account of a reistic reduction of states of affairs. This reduction is based on Katkov’s transformation of Marty’s theory of the secondary intention of statements (linguistically expressed judgements) and on a further development of Brentano’s theory of judgements. According to Katkov’s theory, all linguistically expressed judgements have to manifest two independent judgements if they are to fulfil the communicative goal of a speaker. The first judgement is a basic acceptance or negation of an object. The second is a higher-order belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation. Katkov then reduces states of affairs to the consciousness of objective validity, which consists in such a belief in correctness. In this article I first present some features of Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of linguistic communication of statements. I then offer my own short reply to Katkov’s questions. The study concludes by presenting Katkov’s reduction of states of affairs to a complex of beliefs and by questioning Katkov’s description concerning the difference between sensory perception and rational judgement. This difference motivates Katkov’s separation of a basic acceptance or negation on the one side and a separate belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation on the other.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Consciousness of Judging. Katkov’s Critique of Marty’s State of Affairs and Brentano’s Description of Judgement

Popis výsledku anglicky

This study presents Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of meaning and Brentano’s description of judgemental consciousness. Katkov, a student of Oskar Kraus in Prague, developed an interesting account of a reistic reduction of states of affairs. This reduction is based on Katkov’s transformation of Marty’s theory of the secondary intention of statements (linguistically expressed judgements) and on a further development of Brentano’s theory of judgements. According to Katkov’s theory, all linguistically expressed judgements have to manifest two independent judgements if they are to fulfil the communicative goal of a speaker. The first judgement is a basic acceptance or negation of an object. The second is a higher-order belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation. Katkov then reduces states of affairs to the consciousness of objective validity, which consists in such a belief in correctness. In this article I first present some features of Katkov’s critique of Marty’s theory of linguistic communication of statements. I then offer my own short reply to Katkov’s questions. The study concludes by presenting Katkov’s reduction of states of affairs to a complex of beliefs and by questioning Katkov’s description concerning the difference between sensory perception and rational judgement. This difference motivates Katkov’s separation of a basic acceptance or negation on the one side and a separate belief in the correctness of the acceptance or negation on the other.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA15-18149S" target="_blank" >GA15-18149S: Od logického objektivismu k reismu: Bolzano a Brentanova škola</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty

ISBN

978-3-11-052977-7

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

241-259

Počet stran knihy

400

Název nakladatele

De Gruyter

Místo vydání

Berlin

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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