The naturalness of artificial intelligence from the evolutionary perspective
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F18%3A00497629" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/18:00497629 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0829-5" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0829-5</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00146-018-0829-5" target="_blank" >10.1007/s00146-018-0829-5</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
The naturalness of artificial intelligence from the evolutionary perspective
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Current discussions on artificial intelligence, in both the theoretical and practical realms, contain a fundamental lack of clarity regarding the nature of artificial intelligence, perhaps due to the fact that the distinction between natural and artificial appears, at first sight, both intuitive and evident. Is AI something unnatural, non-human and therefore dangerous to humanity, or is it only a continuation of man’s natural tendency towards creativity? It is not surprising that from the philosophical point of view, this distinction is the basic question that fundamentally affects all other considerations and conclusions pertaining to artificial intelligence. In this article, I would like to explain this difference and draw attention to some conclusions, which may result from a naturalistic perspective with regard to recent philosophical posthumanism. For this purpose, I present several examples of the natural–artificial distinction in the different fields of the philosophy of science and then discuss their implications for the problem of intelligence. Based on Dennett’s conception of intentionality and the naturalistic perspective, I demonstrate that besides the traditional conception, there is a non-anthropocentric evolutionary view in which the natural–artificial distinction disappears and it is possible to see a united process of intelligence creation.nnČlánek byl do RIV zaslán jako "online first" verze. Vyšlo tiskem: AI & Society. 2019, roč. 34, č. 4, s. 889–898. ISSN 0951-5666
Název v anglickém jazyce
The naturalness of artificial intelligence from the evolutionary perspective
Popis výsledku anglicky
Current discussions on artificial intelligence, in both the theoretical and practical realms, contain a fundamental lack of clarity regarding the nature of artificial intelligence, perhaps due to the fact that the distinction between natural and artificial appears, at first sight, both intuitive and evident. Is AI something unnatural, non-human and therefore dangerous to humanity, or is it only a continuation of man’s natural tendency towards creativity? It is not surprising that from the philosophical point of view, this distinction is the basic question that fundamentally affects all other considerations and conclusions pertaining to artificial intelligence. In this article, I would like to explain this difference and draw attention to some conclusions, which may result from a naturalistic perspective with regard to recent philosophical posthumanism. For this purpose, I present several examples of the natural–artificial distinction in the different fields of the philosophy of science and then discuss their implications for the problem of intelligence. Based on Dennett’s conception of intentionality and the naturalistic perspective, I demonstrate that besides the traditional conception, there is a non-anthropocentric evolutionary view in which the natural–artificial distinction disappears and it is possible to see a united process of intelligence creation.nnČlánek byl do RIV zaslán jako "online first" verze. Vyšlo tiskem: AI & Society. 2019, roč. 34, č. 4, s. 889–898. ISSN 0951-5666
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA17-16370S" target="_blank" >GA17-16370S: Redukcionismus a emergence: perspektivy v současné filosofii a metodologii vědy</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2018
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
AI & Society
ISSN
0951-5666
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
—
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
19 February
Stát vydavatele periodika
GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska
Počet stran výsledku
10
Strana od-do
—
Kód UT WoS článku
000490069500019
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85042203018