A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F20%3A00502024" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/20:00502024 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01914-y" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01914-y</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01914-y" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-018-01914-y</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

According to the doctrine of Super-Humeanism (Esfeld in Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1426-8, 2017), the world’s mosaic consists only of permanent matter points and changing spatial relations, while all the other entities and features figuring in scientific theories are nomological parameters, whose role is merely to build the best law system. In this paper, I develop an argument against Super-Humeanism by pointing out that it is vulnerable to and does not have the resources to solve the well-known problem of immanent comparisons. Firstly, I show that it cannot endorse a fundamentalist solution à la Lewis, since its two pillars-a minimalist ontology and a best system account of lawhood—would generate, together, a tedious problem of internal coherence. Secondly, I consider anti-fundamentalist strategies, proposed within Humeanism, and find them inapplicable to the Super-Humean doctrine. The concern is that, since it is impossible to choose the best law system within Super-Humeanism, this doctrine may be charged with incoherence.

Název v anglickém jazyce

A challenge for Super-Humeanism: the problem of immanent comparisons

Popis výsledku anglicky

According to the doctrine of Super-Humeanism (Esfeld in Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1426-8, 2017), the world’s mosaic consists only of permanent matter points and changing spatial relations, while all the other entities and features figuring in scientific theories are nomological parameters, whose role is merely to build the best law system. In this paper, I develop an argument against Super-Humeanism by pointing out that it is vulnerable to and does not have the resources to solve the well-known problem of immanent comparisons. Firstly, I show that it cannot endorse a fundamentalist solution à la Lewis, since its two pillars-a minimalist ontology and a best system account of lawhood—would generate, together, a tedious problem of internal coherence. Secondly, I consider anti-fundamentalist strategies, proposed within Humeanism, and find them inapplicable to the Super-Humean doctrine. The concern is that, since it is impossible to choose the best law system within Super-Humeanism, this doctrine may be charged with incoherence.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Synthese

ISSN

0039-7857

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

197

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

9

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

4001-4020

Kód UT WoS článku

000560460900017

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85053398887