Winch on Political Authority & Obedience

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F20%3A00532150" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/20:00532150 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_7" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_7</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_7" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-40742-1_7</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Winch on Political Authority & Obedience

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The article considers Peter Winch’s novel criticism of Contractarianism in his 1990 “Certainty and Authority”, which links Hume’s criticism with arguments from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Using Wittgenstein he questions the desire-belief conception of action, and the view that all reasonable action, and thus also obedience, is based on justified belief. Winch argues instead that rationality is itself based on primitive and habitual trust – and thus also obedience – of authority. Rationality thus does not ground action but, being integral to the practices of the community, is presupposed by any reasonable decision and action. Against this I argue that primitive reaction and habit cannot make sense of obligation, including that of political obedience, because it ignores its conceptual and free character, furthermore that the genealogical and linear account cannot deal with political authority understood as rule of law, since the latter is itself in an essential part the product of theoretical, indeed philosophical, reasoning.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Winch on Political Authority & Obedience

Popis výsledku anglicky

The article considers Peter Winch’s novel criticism of Contractarianism in his 1990 “Certainty and Authority”, which links Hume’s criticism with arguments from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Using Wittgenstein he questions the desire-belief conception of action, and the view that all reasonable action, and thus also obedience, is based on justified belief. Winch argues instead that rationality is itself based on primitive and habitual trust – and thus also obedience – of authority. Rationality thus does not ground action but, being integral to the practices of the community, is presupposed by any reasonable decision and action. Against this I argue that primitive reaction and habit cannot make sense of obligation, including that of political obedience, because it ignores its conceptual and free character, furthermore that the genealogical and linear account cannot deal with political authority understood as rule of law, since the latter is itself in an essential part the product of theoretical, indeed philosophical, reasoning.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Ethics, Society and Politics: Themes from the Philosophy of Peter Winch

ISBN

978-3-030-40741-4

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

103-115

Počet stran knihy

286

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Cham

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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