The “Offence of any and all Ready-Made Givenness”: Natorp’s Critique of Husserl’s Ideas I

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F21%3A00545804" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/21:00545804 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_4" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_4</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_4" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-030-62159-9_4</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The “Offence of any and all Ready-Made Givenness”: Natorp’s Critique of Husserl’s Ideas I

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I present the first systematic account in the literature of a Husserlian response to Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account (in Ideas I) of the pre-givenness of both the absolute stream of lived-experience and its essences to reflection. My response is presented within the broader context of what I argue is Heidegger’s misappropriation of Natorp’s critique of the phenomenological limits of reflection in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the misguided French attempt to address Heidegger’s critique by introducing the dialectical notion of “pre-reflective” consciousness to phenomenology. My Husserlian response (1) shows that Husserl’s account of reflection in Ideas I is able to rebut Natorp’s critical claims that transcendental phenomenology cannot access the streaming of the stream of lived-experience without “stilling” its flow and (2) that a gap in Husserl’s account of the transformation of the natural phenomenon of reflection into transcendental reflection provides justification for Natorp’s criticism of the ambiguity of Husserl’s account in Ideas I of the givenness of the essence of lived-experience investigated by transcendental phenomenology.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The “Offence of any and all Ready-Made Givenness”: Natorp’s Critique of Husserl’s Ideas I

Popis výsledku anglicky

I present the first systematic account in the literature of a Husserlian response to Natorp’s critique of Husserl’s account (in Ideas I) of the pre-givenness of both the absolute stream of lived-experience and its essences to reflection. My response is presented within the broader context of what I argue is Heidegger’s misappropriation of Natorp’s critique of the phenomenological limits of reflection in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and the misguided French attempt to address Heidegger’s critique by introducing the dialectical notion of “pre-reflective” consciousness to phenomenology. My Husserlian response (1) shows that Husserl’s account of reflection in Ideas I is able to rebut Natorp’s critical claims that transcendental phenomenology cannot access the streaming of the stream of lived-experience without “stilling” its flow and (2) that a gap in Husserl’s account of the transformation of the natural phenomenon of reflection into transcendental reflection provides justification for Natorp’s criticism of the ambiguity of Husserl’s account in Ideas I of the givenness of the essence of lived-experience investigated by transcendental phenomenology.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Idealism-Realism Debate Among Edmund Husserl’s Early Followers and Critics

ISBN

978-3-030-62158-2

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

73-97

Počet stran knihy

311

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Cham

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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