Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F22%3A00562836" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/22:00562836 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-04275-1_11</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Hynek Janoušek turns to the phenomenological tradition and Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Husserl’s phenomenology does not include either a unitary experienced self or a Kantian transcendental self, and he describes the self as a bundle. Husserl’s discussions of Hume form part of a wider appreciation of Hume in the German speaking world at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. There are, however, important differences between the constituents of our bundles for Hume and Husserl. For Husserl, the conscious contents of experience have intentionality, that is, they are experienced as directed at pumpkins and pencils, trees and patches of red, whereas for Hume, such impressions and ideas are described according to their intrinsic character. In the second edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl abandons Hume entirely, as he there comes to accept the existence of a pure unitary ego.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Husserl (and Brentano) on Hume’s Notion of the Self

Popis výsledku anglicky

Hynek Janoušek turns to the phenomenological tradition and Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Husserl’s phenomenology does not include either a unitary experienced self or a Kantian transcendental self, and he describes the self as a bundle. Husserl’s discussions of Hume form part of a wider appreciation of Hume in the German speaking world at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century. There are, however, important differences between the constituents of our bundles for Hume and Husserl. For Husserl, the conscious contents of experience have intentionality, that is, they are experienced as directed at pumpkins and pencils, trees and patches of red, whereas for Hume, such impressions and ideas are described according to their intrinsic character. In the second edition of Logical Investigations, Husserl abandons Hume entirely, as he there comes to accept the existence of a pure unitary ego.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-02972S" target="_blank" >GA20-02972S: Staré a nové ctnosti. Etika ctnosti u Huma a Mandevilla</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Hume on the Self and Personal Identity

ISBN

978-3-031-04274-4

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

251-274

Počet stran knihy

321

Název nakladatele

Palgrave MacMillan

Místo vydání

Cham

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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