Innocence over utilitarianism. Heightened moral standards for robots in rescue dilemmas

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F23%3A00572950" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/23:00572950 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11310/23:10480010

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2936" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2936</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2936" target="_blank" >10.1002/ejsp.2936</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Innocence over utilitarianism. Heightened moral standards for robots in rescue dilemmas

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Research in moral psychology has found that robots, more than humans, are expected to make utilitarian decisions. This expectation is found specifically when contrasting utilitarian action to deontological inaction. In a series of eight experiments (total N = 3752), we compared judgments about robots’ and humans’ decisions in a rescue dilemma with no possibility of deontological inaction. A robot’s decision to rescue an innocent victim of an accident was judged more positively than the decision to rescue two people culpable for the accident (Studies 1–2b). This pattern repeated in a large-scale web survey (Study 3, N = ∼19,000) and reversed when all victims were equally culpable/innocent (Study 5). Differences in judgments about humans’ and robots’ decisions were largest for norm-violating decisions. In sum, robots are not always expected to make utilitarian decisions, and their decisions are judged differently from those of humans based on other moral standards as well.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Innocence over utilitarianism. Heightened moral standards for robots in rescue dilemmas

Popis výsledku anglicky

Research in moral psychology has found that robots, more than humans, are expected to make utilitarian decisions. This expectation is found specifically when contrasting utilitarian action to deontological inaction. In a series of eight experiments (total N = 3752), we compared judgments about robots’ and humans’ decisions in a rescue dilemma with no possibility of deontological inaction. A robot’s decision to rescue an innocent victim of an accident was judged more positively than the decision to rescue two people culpable for the accident (Studies 1–2b). This pattern repeated in a large-scale web survey (Study 3, N = ∼19,000) and reversed when all victims were equally culpable/innocent (Study 5). Differences in judgments about humans’ and robots’ decisions were largest for norm-violating decisions. In sum, robots are not always expected to make utilitarian decisions, and their decisions are judged differently from those of humans based on other moral standards as well.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Journal of Social Psychology

ISSN

0046-2772

e-ISSN

1099-0992

Svazek periodika

53

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

779-804

Kód UT WoS článku

000955799200001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85150948051