The brain-based argument for unconscious sensory qualities

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F24%3A00580585" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/24:00580585 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-12" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-12</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-12" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003409526-12</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The brain-based argument for unconscious sensory qualities

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This chapter explores the notion of conscious and unconscious sensory qualities and challenges the traditional view that sensory qualities are exclusively conscious. Two arguments are offered for the existence of unconscious sensory qualities: the behavioural and the neural. The upshot of both arguments is that the similarities between conscious and unconscious sensory states are much greater than typically assumed in both the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. In fact, both arguments (and especially the latter one, which is explored at some length in the chapter) support the view that the mechanisms of sensory qualities are literally the same in conscious and unconscious perceptual conditions. This has important implications for general theories of consciousness and for research on neural correlates of consciousness.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The brain-based argument for unconscious sensory qualities

Popis výsledku anglicky

This chapter explores the notion of conscious and unconscious sensory qualities and challenges the traditional view that sensory qualities are exclusively conscious. Two arguments are offered for the existence of unconscious sensory qualities: the behavioural and the neural. The upshot of both arguments is that the similarities between conscious and unconscious sensory states are much greater than typically assumed in both the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness. In fact, both arguments (and especially the latter one, which is explored at some length in the chapter) support the view that the mechanisms of sensory qualities are literally the same in conscious and unconscious perceptual conditions. This has important implications for general theories of consciousness and for research on neural correlates of consciousness.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-14445S" target="_blank" >GA20-14445S: Duální modely fenomenálního vědomí</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Conscious and Unconscious Mentality. Examining their Nature, Similarities, and Differences

ISBN

978-1-032-52979-0

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

157-173

Počet stran knihy

332

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

London

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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