Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F24%3A00586286" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/24:00586286 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims against a recent criticism according to which the unconscious phenomenal character of colours exists externally to the subject. We defend internalism about (potentially unconscious) phenomenal character by appealing to recent neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, and by rejecting the claim that externalism about phenomenal character is dialectically in a better position than internalism. In addition, we briefly present certain difficulties for externalist views of phenomenal character. These concern cases where the perceptual relation fails, but a perceptual experience still results. These points suffice to defuse the externalist critique of our view, and support the internalist variant of the consciousness-independence claim as the most plausible account of the unconscious phenomenal character of colours.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character

Popis výsledku anglicky

Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims against a recent criticism according to which the unconscious phenomenal character of colours exists externally to the subject. We defend internalism about (potentially unconscious) phenomenal character by appealing to recent neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, and by rejecting the claim that externalism about phenomenal character is dialectically in a better position than internalism. In addition, we briefly present certain difficulties for externalist views of phenomenal character. These concern cases where the perceptual relation fails, but a perceptual experience still results. These points suffice to defuse the externalist critique of our view, and support the internalist variant of the consciousness-independence claim as the most plausible account of the unconscious phenomenal character of colours.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-14445S" target="_blank" >GA20-14445S: Duální modely fenomenálního vědomí</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Synthese

ISSN

0039-7857

e-ISSN

1573-0964

Svazek periodika

203

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

169

Kód UT WoS článku

001221341300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85192882049