Are Proofs Objects or Acts? A Comparison of Prawitz’s and Sundholm’s Semantics

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F24%3A00616871" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/24:00616871 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52411-0_6" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52411-0_6</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52411-0_6" target="_blank" >10.1007/978-3-031-52411-0_6</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Are Proofs Objects or Acts? A Comparison of Prawitz’s and Sundholm’s Semantics

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In a paper from 1998, Göran Sundholm has tried to convince Dag Prawitz that a semantic theory of deduction had better employ three notions of proof: proof-object, proof-act and proof-trace. In Prawitz’s semantics of valid arguments, however, the three notions can be said to collapse into each other. In this paper I shall first of all argue that this collapse results in a number of circularity and decidability problems. I shall also argue that it is maybe for getting rid of these problems that Prawitz’s later theory of grounds seems to allow for an objects-acts-traces distinction partly reminiscent of Sundholm’s. But Prawitz’s ground-theoretic picture retains many significant peculiarities. These mainly concern the way objects, acts and traces relate to each other and the epistemic status assigned to proof-objects. The main aim of this paper is to provide an overview and comparison of Prawitz’s and Sundholm’s semantics, and to argue that the divergences between the two stem from a difference in how Prawitz and Sundholm respectively conceive of the notion of assertion. To conclude, I discuss a problem of vacuous validity recently raised by Prawitz and investigate to some extent the possibility of reading it via Sundholm’s (and Martin-Löf’s) approach(es).

Název v anglickém jazyce

Are Proofs Objects or Acts? A Comparison of Prawitz’s and Sundholm’s Semantics

Popis výsledku anglicky

In a paper from 1998, Göran Sundholm has tried to convince Dag Prawitz that a semantic theory of deduction had better employ three notions of proof: proof-object, proof-act and proof-trace. In Prawitz’s semantics of valid arguments, however, the three notions can be said to collapse into each other. In this paper I shall first of all argue that this collapse results in a number of circularity and decidability problems. I shall also argue that it is maybe for getting rid of these problems that Prawitz’s later theory of grounds seems to allow for an objects-acts-traces distinction partly reminiscent of Sundholm’s. But Prawitz’s ground-theoretic picture retains many significant peculiarities. These mainly concern the way objects, acts and traces relate to each other and the epistemic status assigned to proof-objects. The main aim of this paper is to provide an overview and comparison of Prawitz’s and Sundholm’s semantics, and to argue that the divergences between the two stem from a difference in how Prawitz and Sundholm respectively conceive of the notion of assertion. To conclude, I discuss a problem of vacuous validity recently raised by Prawitz and investigate to some extent the possibility of reading it via Sundholm’s (and Martin-Löf’s) approach(es).

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The Architecture and Archaeology of Modern Logic. Studies Dedicated to Göran Sundholm

ISBN

978-3-031-52410-3

Počet stran výsledku

52

Strana od-do

63-114

Počet stran knihy

510

Název nakladatele

Springer

Místo vydání

Cham

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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