Bounding Reason. Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Discursive Agency of LLMs

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F25%3A00638727" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/25:00638727 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/62690094:18460/25:50022617

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-025-09761-6" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-025-09761-6</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10516-025-09761-6" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10516-025-09761-6</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Bounding Reason. Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Discursive Agency of LLMs

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Recent discussions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) safety often invoke the orthogonality thesis—the idea that intelligence and final goals can be independent variables, allowing for the possibility of radically alien AI agents. This paper challenges this view by examining the relationship between language, intentionality, and rational agency against the background of how we now think about Large Language Models (LLMs). Drawing on Robert Brandom’s normative inferentialism and accounts of LLMs as role-playing dialogue agents, we argue that the linguistic competence demonstrated by LLMs suggests significant constraints on their artificial agency. We contend that participation in human discursive practices, which has an inherent normative dimension, may bind specific artificial agents to forms of rationality that are continuous with human reasoning. By analysing recent work on LLM linguistic behaviour, we demonstrate how these systems engage with human normative practices in ways that complicate AI sceptics’ dismissal of LLM capabilities and AI safety theorists’ speculations about future AI agents. We defend Brandom’s approach against charges of insufficient naturalism that could be put forward by the AI safety theorist camp while arguing that his account of language and rationality as inherently social practices provides crucial insights into the nature and potential limits of artificial agency. Our analysis suggests that the development of language-capable AI systems may be constrained by the normative structure of human discursive practices in ways that bind specific quadrants of the space of possible artificial minds.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Bounding Reason. Inferentialism, Naturalism, and the Discursive Agency of LLMs

Popis výsledku anglicky

Recent discussions of Artificial Intelligence (AI) safety often invoke the orthogonality thesis—the idea that intelligence and final goals can be independent variables, allowing for the possibility of radically alien AI agents. This paper challenges this view by examining the relationship between language, intentionality, and rational agency against the background of how we now think about Large Language Models (LLMs). Drawing on Robert Brandom’s normative inferentialism and accounts of LLMs as role-playing dialogue agents, we argue that the linguistic competence demonstrated by LLMs suggests significant constraints on their artificial agency. We contend that participation in human discursive practices, which has an inherent normative dimension, may bind specific artificial agents to forms of rationality that are continuous with human reasoning. By analysing recent work on LLM linguistic behaviour, we demonstrate how these systems engage with human normative practices in ways that complicate AI sceptics’ dismissal of LLM capabilities and AI safety theorists’ speculations about future AI agents. We defend Brandom’s approach against charges of insufficient naturalism that could be put forward by the AI safety theorist camp while arguing that his account of language and rationality as inherently social practices provides crucial insights into the nature and potential limits of artificial agency. Our analysis suggests that the development of language-capable AI systems may be constrained by the normative structure of human discursive practices in ways that bind specific quadrants of the space of possible artificial minds.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-07119S" target="_blank" >GA23-07119S: VÝZNAM JAKO OBJEKT - PRINCIPY SÉMANTICKÝCH TEORIÍ</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Global Philosophy

ISSN

2948-152X

e-ISSN

2948-1538

Svazek periodika

35

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

27

Strana od-do

25

Kód UT WoS článku

001562585700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105018598892