Režim rozděleného vlastnictví pro elektrárenské společnosti v EU:případ legislativního a regulačního úlovku?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F08%3A00312628" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/08:00312628 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/08:00317843

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies (Vertically Integrated Utilities, VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through means of persuasion which should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The unbundling regime for electricity utilities in the EU: a case of legislative and regulatory capture?

Popis výsledku anglicky

Theory and empirics suggest that by curbing competition, incumbent electricity companies (Vertically Integrated Utilities, VIUs), can increase their profitability through combined ownership of generation and transmission and/or distribution networks. Because curbing competition is believed to be welfare-reducing, EU law requires unbundling (separation) of the VIU networks. However, the EU allows its member states the choice between incomplete (legal) and complete (ownership) unbundling. There is evidence that VIUs have tried to influence this choice through means of persuasion which should be more readily available in countries with a more corrupted political culture. This paper shows that among the old EU member states, countries which are perceived as more corrupt are indeed more likely to apply weaker forms of unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not obtain a similar finding for the EU member states that acceded in 2004. We provide a conjecture for this observation.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/LC542" target="_blank" >LC542: Centrum pro pokročilá politicko-ekonomická studia</a><br>

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2008

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Energy Economics

ISSN

0140-9883

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

30

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

6

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

—

Kód UT WoS článku

000260272900025

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—