Contagion through learning

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F08%3A00343729" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/08:00343729 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Contagion through learning

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of contagion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the outcomes generally differ.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Contagion through learning

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the current ones. Contagion may lead to unique long-run outcomes where multiplicity would occur if players learned through repeatedly playing the same game. The process of contagion through learning is formally related to contagion in global games, although the outcomes generally differ.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/LC542" target="_blank" >LC542: Centrum pro pokročilá politicko-ekonomická studia</a><br>

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2008

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Theoretical economics

ISSN

1555-7561

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

3

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

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Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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