Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F11%3A00373121" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/11:00373121 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.008" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.008</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.008" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.008</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The theory of competitive markets predicts that the effect of a price ceiling on the level of prices is either negative (in case the ceiling is binding) or zero (in case the ceiling is at or above the competitive price). Industrial economists such as Scherer and Ross (1990), however, have argued that price ceilings can weaken competition as they may serve as collusive focal points for pricing decisions (Schelling, 1960). To see this, note that the Folk Theorem (see for example Tirole, 1988) predicts that infinitely many prices can occur as outcomes of collusive equilibria in infinitely repeated games if the discount factor is sufficiently high. This suggests a coordination problem when firms attempt to collude. Here, a price ceiling may function as a focal point on which firms coordinate. Thus, price ceilings could facilitate tacit collusion and lead to higher prices.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Collusion through price ceilings? In search of a focal-point effect

Popis výsledku anglicky

The theory of competitive markets predicts that the effect of a price ceiling on the level of prices is either negative (in case the ceiling is binding) or zero (in case the ceiling is at or above the competitive price). Industrial economists such as Scherer and Ross (1990), however, have argued that price ceilings can weaken competition as they may serve as collusive focal points for pricing decisions (Schelling, 1960). To see this, note that the Folk Theorem (see for example Tirole, 1988) predicts that infinitely many prices can occur as outcomes of collusive equilibria in infinitely repeated games if the discount factor is sufficiently high. This suggests a coordination problem when firms attempt to collude. Here, a price ceiling may function as a focal point on which firms coordinate. Thus, price ceilings could facilitate tacit collusion and lead to higher prices.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2011

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

ISSN

0167-2681

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

79

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

291-302

Kód UT WoS článku

000294029400011

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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