Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F14%3A00429243" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/14:00429243 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates viaan indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have

Název v anglickém jazyce

Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis

Popis výsledku anglicky

In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction channels. When subjects play both roles in such experiments, a positive correlation between first- and second-mover behavior is frequently reported. We find that the observed correlation primarily originates viaan indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs through a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. Specifically, beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. However, we also find evidence for a direct, preference-based channel. When first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Games and Economic Behavior

ISSN

0899-8256

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

87

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

September

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

122-135

Kód UT WoS článku

000343391800008

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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