To bribe or not to bribe? Corruption uncertainty and corporate practices
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F17%3A00478449" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/17:00478449 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
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DOI - Digital Object Identifier
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Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
To bribe or not to bribe? Corruption uncertainty and corporate practices
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Using a large sample of private firms over the period from 2001 to 2013, we study the effect of corruption uncertainty on corporate investments and cash holdings. We find that a higher uncertainty about the level of corruption is associated with lower corporate investments and lower cash holdings. These results are sensitive to the ownership structure of a firm. Firms with no foreign majority ownership appear to be more sensitive to corruption-induced uncertainty than majority-controlled foreign firms. They significantly decrease their investments and cash holdings. We hypothesize that they move their cash off-balance-sheet to create cash reserves as the uncertainty of when, whom, and how much to bribe increases.
Název v anglickém jazyce
To bribe or not to bribe? Corruption uncertainty and corporate practices
Popis výsledku anglicky
Using a large sample of private firms over the period from 2001 to 2013, we study the effect of corruption uncertainty on corporate investments and cash holdings. We find that a higher uncertainty about the level of corruption is associated with lower corporate investments and lower cash holdings. These results are sensitive to the ownership structure of a firm. Firms with no foreign majority ownership appear to be more sensitive to corruption-induced uncertainty than majority-controlled foreign firms. They significantly decrease their investments and cash holdings. We hypothesize that they move their cash off-balance-sheet to create cash reserves as the uncertainty of when, whom, and how much to bribe increases.
Klasifikace
Druh
O - Ostatní výsledky
CEP obor
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OECD FORD obor
50206 - Finance
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA16-20451S" target="_blank" >GA16-20451S: Správa a řízení společností v mezinárodním prostředí - Nové poznatky</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2017
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů