Dynamic elections and ideological polarization

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F17%3A00481444" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/17:00481444 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/17:00483652

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.24" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.24</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/pan.2017.24" target="_blank" >10.1017/pan.2017.24</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Dynamic elections and ideological polarization

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

How does political polarization affect the welfare of the electorate? We analyze this question using a framework in which two policy and office motivated parties compete in an infinite sequence of elections. We propose two novel measures to describe the degree of conflict among agents: antagonism is the disagreement between parties, extremism is the disagreement between each party and the representative voter. These two measures do not coincide when parties care about multiple issues. We show that forward-looking parties have an incentive to implement policies favored by the representative voter, in an attempt to constrain future challengers. This incentive grows as antagonism increases. On the other hand, extremism decreases the electorate’s welfare. We discuss the methodological and empirical implications for the existing measures of political actors’ ideal points and for the debate on elite polarization.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Dynamic elections and ideological polarization

Popis výsledku anglicky

How does political polarization affect the welfare of the electorate? We analyze this question using a framework in which two policy and office motivated parties compete in an infinite sequence of elections. We propose two novel measures to describe the degree of conflict among agents: antagonism is the disagreement between parties, extremism is the disagreement between each party and the representative voter. These two measures do not coincide when parties care about multiple issues. We show that forward-looking parties have an incentive to implement policies favored by the representative voter, in an attempt to constrain future challengers. This incentive grows as antagonism increases. On the other hand, extremism decreases the electorate’s welfare. We discuss the methodological and empirical implications for the existing measures of political actors’ ideal points and for the debate on elite polarization.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Political Analysis

ISSN

1047-1987

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

25

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

30

Strana od-do

505-534

Kód UT WoS článku

000423295500006

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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