Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: evidence from a wage reform

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F21%3A00549385" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/21:00549385 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jce.2021.04.004</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: evidence from a wage reform

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Incumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Political salaries, electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: evidence from a wage reform

Popis výsledku anglicky

Incumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF16_013%2F0001740" target="_blank" >EF16_013/0001740: SHARE-CZ+ Národní výzkum stárnutí</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Comparative Economics

ISSN

0147-5967

e-ISSN

1095-7227

Svazek periodika

49

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

1020-1047

Kód UT WoS článku

000756859700009

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85106562617