Copyright and firms’ own IPR protection in a software market: monopoly versus duopoly

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F23%3A00570694" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/23:00570694 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/23:00582620

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106282" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106282</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106282" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106282</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Copyright and firms’ own IPR protection in a software market: monopoly versus duopoly

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In a duopoly, we study the interaction between public (copyright) and private protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Software developers offer products with differing qualities and compete for heterogeneous users, who may buy a legal version, an illegal copy, or no product. Illegal usage is punishable when caught. A developer decides whether to use private IPR protection, given the degree of public IPR protection. We analyze the impact of private and public IPR protection on the developers’ pricing, using monopoly as a benchmark. We show that monopoly pricing is not marginally affected by either public or private protection. We also show that both types of protection may affect duopoly pricing by softening price competition. Finally, we find the interaction between public and private protection in a duopoly but not in a monopoly. Moreover, strategic substitutability and complementarity can exist between the public and private IPR, depending on the strength of the copyright.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Copyright and firms’ own IPR protection in a software market: monopoly versus duopoly

Popis výsledku anglicky

In a duopoly, we study the interaction between public (copyright) and private protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). Software developers offer products with differing qualities and compete for heterogeneous users, who may buy a legal version, an illegal copy, or no product. Illegal usage is punishable when caught. A developer decides whether to use private IPR protection, given the degree of public IPR protection. We analyze the impact of private and public IPR protection on the developers’ pricing, using monopoly as a benchmark. We show that monopoly pricing is not marginally affected by either public or private protection. We also show that both types of protection may affect duopoly pricing by softening price competition. Finally, we find the interaction between public and private protection in a duopoly but not in a monopoly. Moreover, strategic substitutability and complementarity can exist between the public and private IPR, depending on the strength of the copyright.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Economic Modelling

ISSN

0264-9993

e-ISSN

1873-6122

Svazek periodika

123

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

June

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

106282

Kód UT WoS článku

001054775800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85163643215