Factional Splits in Proto-Hegemonic Mass Parties: The Case of the Welfare/Virtue Party in Turkey

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Factional Splits in Proto-Hegemonic Mass Parties: The Case of the Welfare/Virtue Party in Turkey

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

What leads to factional split in proto-hegemonic mass parties characterized by ultra-nationalism, socialism or religious fundamentalism? In our study, we show that in such parties the struggle of the opposition factions against the party leader?s policies resembles the struggle of the opposition forces in authoritarian regimes. We build a game-theoretic model of factional split borrowing from the collective action theory used in revolution studies: The collective action problem, together with the fact that the party leader possesses an extensive control over the party organization, makes the replacement of the party leader with the opposition?s candidate unlikely. We argue that it is *incomplete power transformation* that typically results in factionalsplit in these parties: The opposition succeeds in accumulating some power vis-?-vis the party leader but this amount of power is insufficient for the leadership turnover to occur. On the other hand, it may be sufficient to establish the

Název v anglickém jazyce

Factional Splits in Proto-Hegemonic Mass Parties: The Case of the Welfare/Virtue Party in Turkey

Popis výsledku anglicky

What leads to factional split in proto-hegemonic mass parties characterized by ultra-nationalism, socialism or religious fundamentalism? In our study, we show that in such parties the struggle of the opposition factions against the party leader?s policies resembles the struggle of the opposition forces in authoritarian regimes. We build a game-theoretic model of factional split borrowing from the collective action theory used in revolution studies: The collective action problem, together with the fact that the party leader possesses an extensive control over the party organization, makes the replacement of the party leader with the opposition?s candidate unlikely. We argue that it is *incomplete power transformation* that typically results in factionalsplit in these parties: The opposition succeeds in accumulating some power vis-?-vis the party leader but this amount of power is insufficient for the leadership turnover to occur. On the other hand, it may be sufficient to establish the

Druh

W - Uspořádání workshopu

CEP obor

AD - Politologie a politické vědy

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Místo konání akce

Praha

Stát konání akce

CZ - Česká republika

Datum zahájení akce

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Datum ukončení akce

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Celkový počet účastníků

4

Počet zahraničních účastníků

1

Typ akce podle státní přísl. účastníků

EUR - Evropská akce