Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68378122%3A_____%2F13%3A00397288" target="_blank" >RIV/68378122:_____/13:00397288 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4476/74761" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4476/74761</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4476/74761" target="_blank" >10.4476/74761</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features of practical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua being reasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents? capacity to reflect on them as reasons (which he labels Reason?). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptions of normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz?s account: on the first of them, reasons remain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective;the other, takes reasons to be objective normative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason). I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependence and suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective and motivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of the paper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Normativity and Reason-Dependence; A Comment on the Nature of Reasons

Popis výsledku anglicky

In his recent From Normativity to Responsibility Joseph Raz argues for three features of practical reasons: that they are facts; that they are facts that can motivate agents qua being reasons; and that they motivate agents in virtue of agents? capacity to reflect on them as reasons (which he labels Reason?). The paper identifies a tension between two conceptions of normativity that seem to co-exist in Raz?s account: on the first of them, reasons remain psychologically efficacious albeit too subjective;the other, takes reasons to be objective normative facts which exist independently of our practical reasoning (or Reason). I caution against a conflation between mind-dependence (psychologism) and Reasondependence and suggest that practical reasons can remain simultaneously objective and motivating if we understand them in a Reason-dependent fashion. In the course of the paper a number of related questions on the nature of reasons are discussed and clarified.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AG - Právní vědy

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Politica & Societ?

ISSN

2240-7901

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

2

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

IT - Italská republika

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

449-474

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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