Multi-agent Contracting and Reconfiguration in Competitive Environments using Acquaintance Models

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F06%3A00119348" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/06:00119348 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Multi-agent Contracting and Reconfiguration in Competitive Environments using Acquaintance Models

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

A cooperation of agents in competitive environments is more complicated than in collaborative ones. Both the replanning and reconfiguration play the crucial role in the cooperation and introduce a means for an implementation of a system flexibility. Theconcepts of commitments, decommitments with the penalties and subcontractions may facilitate effective reconfiguration and replanning. Agents in competitive environments are fully autonomous and self-interested. Therefore the setting of penalties and theprofit computation cannot be provided centrally. Both the costs and gain differ from agent to agent with respect to contracts already agreed and resources load. This paper proposes an acquaintance model for contracting in competitive environments and introduces possibilities of a reconfiguration in competitive environments as a means of a decommitment optimization with respect to resources load and profit maximization.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Multi-agent Contracting and Reconfiguration in Competitive Environments using Acquaintance Models

Popis výsledku anglicky

A cooperation of agents in competitive environments is more complicated than in collaborative ones. Both the replanning and reconfiguration play the crucial role in the cooperation and introduce a means for an implementation of a system flexibility. Theconcepts of commitments, decommitments with the penalties and subcontractions may facilitate effective reconfiguration and replanning. Agents in competitive environments are fully autonomous and self-interested. Therefore the setting of penalties and theprofit computation cannot be provided centrally. Both the costs and gain differ from agent to agent with respect to contracts already agreed and resources load. This paper proposes an acquaintance model for contracting in competitive environments and introduces possibilities of a reconfiguration in competitive environments as a means of a decommitment optimization with respect to resources load and profit maximization.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

JC - Počítačový hardware a software

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2006

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů