Analysis of electricity industry liberalization in Great Britain: How did the bidding behavior of electricity producers change?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F15%3A00233389" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/15:00233389 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/67985998:_____/15:00447461

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178715300126" target="_blank" >http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178715300126</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2015.07.004" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.jup.2015.07.004</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Analysis of electricity industry liberalization in Great Britain: How did the bidding behavior of electricity producers change?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Promoting competition among electricity producers is crucial for ensuring allocative efficiency and lower electricity prices. This paper empirically examines the wholesale electricity market of England and Wales in order to analyze to what extent regulatory reforms were successful at promoting competition among electricity producers. As a theoretical benchmark we consider a duopoly case, based on which a regression model is specified. The estimation of the regression model allows for documenting new results about the impact of regulatory reforms on the incentive and disincentive to exercise market power by electricity producers during the liberalization process.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Analysis of electricity industry liberalization in Great Britain: How did the bidding behavior of electricity producers change?

Popis výsledku anglicky

Promoting competition among electricity producers is crucial for ensuring allocative efficiency and lower electricity prices. This paper empirically examines the wholesale electricity market of England and Wales in order to analyze to what extent regulatory reforms were successful at promoting competition among electricity producers. As a theoretical benchmark we consider a duopoly case, based on which a regression model is specified. The estimation of the regression model allows for documenting new results about the impact of regulatory reforms on the incentive and disincentive to exercise market power by electricity producers during the liberalization process.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Utilities Policy

ISSN

0957-1787

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

36

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

October

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

24-34

Kód UT WoS článku

000366069100003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84940783666