Path Hopping: An MTD Strategy for Long-Term Quantum-Safe Communication
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F18%3A00326122" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/18:00326122 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://www.hindawi.com/journals/scn/2018/8475818/" target="_blank" >https://www.hindawi.com/journals/scn/2018/8475818/</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/8475818" target="_blank" >10.1155/2018/8475818</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Path Hopping: An MTD Strategy for Long-Term Quantum-Safe Communication
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Moving target defense (MTD) strategies have been widely studied for securing computer systems. We consider using MTD strategies to provide long-term cryptographic security for message transmission against an eavesdropping adversary who has access to a quantum computer. In such a setting, today's widely used cryptographic systems including Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol and RSA cryptosystem will be insecure and alternative solutions are needed. We will use a physical assumption, existence of multiple communication paths between the sender and the receiver, as the basis of security, and propose a cryptographic system that uses this assumption and an MTD strategy to guarantee efficient long-term information theoretic security even when only a single path is not eavesdropped. Following the approach of Maleki et al., we model the system using a Markov chain, derive its transition probabilities, propose two security measures, and prove results that show how to calculate these measures using transition probabilities. We define two types of attackers that we call risk-taking and risk-averse and compute our proposed measures for the two types of adversaries for a concrete MTD strategy. We will use numerical analysis to study tradeoffs between system parameters, discuss our results, and propose directions for future research.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Path Hopping: An MTD Strategy for Long-Term Quantum-Safe Communication
Popis výsledku anglicky
Moving target defense (MTD) strategies have been widely studied for securing computer systems. We consider using MTD strategies to provide long-term cryptographic security for message transmission against an eavesdropping adversary who has access to a quantum computer. In such a setting, today's widely used cryptographic systems including Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol and RSA cryptosystem will be insecure and alternative solutions are needed. We will use a physical assumption, existence of multiple communication paths between the sender and the receiver, as the basis of security, and propose a cryptographic system that uses this assumption and an MTD strategy to guarantee efficient long-term information theoretic security even when only a single path is not eavesdropped. Following the approach of Maleki et al., we model the system using a Markov chain, derive its transition probabilities, propose two security measures, and prove results that show how to calculate these measures using transition probabilities. We define two types of attackers that we call risk-taking and risk-averse and compute our proposed measures for the two types of adversaries for a concrete MTD strategy. We will use numerical analysis to study tradeoffs between system parameters, discuss our results, and propose directions for future research.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
—
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2018
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Security and Communication Networks
ISSN
1939-0114
e-ISSN
1939-0122
Svazek periodika
2018
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
8475818
Stát vydavatele periodika
DE - Spolková republika Německo
Počet stran výsledku
15
Strana od-do
—
Kód UT WoS článku
000432786000001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85047536370