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Subgroup fairness in two-sided markets

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F23%3A00364563" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/23:00364563 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

    <a href="https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281443" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281443</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0281443" target="_blank" >10.1371/journal.pone.0281443</a>

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Subgroup fairness in two-sided markets

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    It is well known that two-sided markets are unfair in a number of ways. For example, female drivers on ride-hailing platforms earn less than their male colleagues per mile driven. Similar observations have been made for other minority subgroups in other two-sided markets. Here, we suggest a novel market-clearing mechanism for two-sided markets, which promotes equalization of the pay per hour worked across multiple subgroups, as well as within each subgroup. In the process, we introduce a novel notion of subgroup fairness (which we call Inter-fairness), which can be combined with other notions of fairness within each subgroup (called Intra-fairness), and the utility for the customers (Customer-Care) in the objective of the market-clearing problem. Although the novel non-linear terms in the objective complicate market clearing by making the problem non-convex, we show that a certain nonconvex augmented Lagrangian relaxation can be approximated to any precision in time polynomial in the number of market participants using semidefinite programming, thanks to its "hidden convexity". This makes it possible to implement the market-clearing mechanism efficiently. On the example of driver-ride assignment in an Uber-like system, we demonstrate the efficacy and scalability of the approach and trade-offs between Inter- and Intrafairness.

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Subgroup fairness in two-sided markets

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    It is well known that two-sided markets are unfair in a number of ways. For example, female drivers on ride-hailing platforms earn less than their male colleagues per mile driven. Similar observations have been made for other minority subgroups in other two-sided markets. Here, we suggest a novel market-clearing mechanism for two-sided markets, which promotes equalization of the pay per hour worked across multiple subgroups, as well as within each subgroup. In the process, we introduce a novel notion of subgroup fairness (which we call Inter-fairness), which can be combined with other notions of fairness within each subgroup (called Intra-fairness), and the utility for the customers (Customer-Care) in the objective of the market-clearing problem. Although the novel non-linear terms in the objective complicate market clearing by making the problem non-convex, we show that a certain nonconvex augmented Lagrangian relaxation can be approximated to any precision in time polynomial in the number of market participants using semidefinite programming, thanks to its "hidden convexity". This makes it possible to implement the market-clearing mechanism efficiently. On the example of driver-ride assignment in an Uber-like system, we demonstrate the efficacy and scalability of the approach and trade-offs between Inter- and Intrafairness.

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

  • CEP obor

  • OECD FORD obor

    10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

    <a href="/cs/project/EF16_019%2F0000765" target="_blank" >EF16_019/0000765: Výzkumné centrum informatiky</a><br>

  • Návaznosti

    P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2023

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku

  • Název periodika

    PLoS ONE

  • ISSN

    1932-6203

  • e-ISSN

    1932-6203

  • Svazek periodika

    18

  • Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

    2

  • Stát vydavatele periodika

    US - Spojené státy americké

  • Počet stran výsledku

    17

  • Strana od-do

  • Kód UT WoS článku

    000942161600045

  • EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

    2-s2.0-85148772765