Values of games over Boolean player sets

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21230%2F23%3A00366651" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21230/23:00366651 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.108925" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.108925</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.108925" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.ijar.2023.108925</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Values of games over Boolean player sets

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this paper, we study new classes of value operators for coalitional games with players organized into a boolean algebra. Coalitional games are cooperative models in which players can form coalitions to maximize profit. The basic solution concepts in such game scenarios are value operators, which assign a unique real value to every player, reflecting thus selected principles of economic rationality. Some value concepts were extended beyond the classic coalitional model where every coalition of players can form. In particular, the extension of Shapley value exists for coalitional games in which players are partially ordered, and the feasible coalitions are the corresponding down-sets. Interestingly, this game-theoretic framework was employed in the method called Information Attribution. This method aims to solve the information decomposition problem, which asks for a particular additive decomposition of the mutual information between the input and target random variables. In such information-theoretic games, the players are predictors, and their set has the natural structure of a boolean algebra. Motivated by the original problem, we consider coalitional games where the players form a boolean algebra, and the coalitions are the corresponding down-sets. This more general approach enables us to study various value solution concepts in detail. Namely, we focus on the classes of values that can represent alternatives to the solution of the information decomposition problem, such as random-order values or sharing values. We extend the axiomatic characterization of some classes of values that were known only for the standard coalitional games.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Values of games over Boolean player sets

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this paper, we study new classes of value operators for coalitional games with players organized into a boolean algebra. Coalitional games are cooperative models in which players can form coalitions to maximize profit. The basic solution concepts in such game scenarios are value operators, which assign a unique real value to every player, reflecting thus selected principles of economic rationality. Some value concepts were extended beyond the classic coalitional model where every coalition of players can form. In particular, the extension of Shapley value exists for coalitional games in which players are partially ordered, and the feasible coalitions are the corresponding down-sets. Interestingly, this game-theoretic framework was employed in the method called Information Attribution. This method aims to solve the information decomposition problem, which asks for a particular additive decomposition of the mutual information between the input and target random variables. In such information-theoretic games, the players are predictors, and their set has the natural structure of a boolean algebra. Motivated by the original problem, we consider coalitional games where the players form a boolean algebra, and the coalitions are the corresponding down-sets. This more general approach enables us to study various value solution concepts in detail. Namely, we focus on the classes of values that can represent alternatives to the solution of the information decomposition problem, such as random-order values or sharing values. We extend the axiomatic characterization of some classes of values that were known only for the standard coalitional games.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

10201 - Computer sciences, information science, bioinformathics (hardware development to be 2.2, social aspect to be 5.8)

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Approximate Reasoning

ISSN

0888-613X

e-ISSN

1873-4731

Svazek periodika

158

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

July

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

1-21

Kód UT WoS článku

000989570300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85153507486