Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21240%2F23%3A00366811" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21240/23:00366811 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10155040" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10155040</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10155040" target="_blank" >10.1109/MECO58584.2023.10155040</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Cryptography is omnipresent in our daily life, as we need it for trusted authentication (e.g., in access systems), secure communication, ensuring data integrity and confidentiality, and many more. However, even if mathematically secure ciphers are used, the device running the cryptographic algorithms is still vul-nerable to side-channel attacks that may reveal the secrets. These attacks exploit the fact that power consumption or electromagnetic emanation of the device depends on processed data. To prevent such an attack, the designer must employ countermeasures, such as masking, hiding, or shuffling. In this paper, we focus on Microchip CEC1702 microcontroller that supports common cryptographic operations in hardware. We analyze the resistance of its AES accelerator against correlation power analysis (CPA). We analyzed 100 million power traces by first-order CPA and univariate second-order CPA. In neither case did we find any vulnerability.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Side-Channel Analysis of Cryptographic Processor CEC 1702

Popis výsledku anglicky

Cryptography is omnipresent in our daily life, as we need it for trusted authentication (e.g., in access systems), secure communication, ensuring data integrity and confidentiality, and many more. However, even if mathematically secure ciphers are used, the device running the cryptographic algorithms is still vul-nerable to side-channel attacks that may reveal the secrets. These attacks exploit the fact that power consumption or electromagnetic emanation of the device depends on processed data. To prevent such an attack, the designer must employ countermeasures, such as masking, hiding, or shuffling. In this paper, we focus on Microchip CEC1702 microcontroller that supports common cryptographic operations in hardware. We analyze the resistance of its AES accelerator against correlation power analysis (CPA). We analyzed 100 million power traces by first-order CPA and univariate second-order CPA. In neither case did we find any vulnerability.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

20206 - Computer hardware and architecture

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/VJ02010010" target="_blank" >VJ02010010: Nástroje pro verifikaci bezpečnosti kryptografických zařízení s využitím AI</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Proceedings of 2023 12th Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)

ISBN

979-8-3503-2291-0

ISSN

2637-9511

e-ISSN

2637-9511

Počet stran výsledku

4

Strana od-do

—

Název nakladatele

IEEE

Místo vydání

Piscataway

Místo konání akce

Budva

Datum konání akce

6. 6. 2023

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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