Generalization of results and neoclassical rationality: unresolved controversies of behavioural economics methodology

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F68407700%3A21630%2F19%3A00327264" target="_blank" >RIV/68407700:21630/19:00327264 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-019-00837-1" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-019-00837-1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11135-019-00837-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11135-019-00837-1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Generalization of results and neoclassical rationality: unresolved controversies of behavioural economics methodology

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Many of behavioural economists have succumbed to misconception that economic models must be identified with observable reality. Therefore, behavioural approach enriches the sober neoclassical models with various psychological aspects of decision making in order to describe immediate reality more accurately. However, in contrast to natural sciences, social sciences aim at variance-based phenomena and thus the trade-off between theoretical objectiveness and empirical particularity remains. Behavioural insights are then at risk of being a mere fragmented empirical “evidence” of psychological descriptivism, which in combination with typical value neutrality should keep us vigilant about application in public policy. Secondly, the paper provides a progressive reading of rationality through a neoclassical lens. It is argued that rationality of a typical Bayesian decision-maker is immune to most of behavioural critique. It is shown on various examples that central behavioural concepts like satisficing behaviour or prospect theory cannot fundamentally challenge pillars of the neoclassical framework.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Generalization of results and neoclassical rationality: unresolved controversies of behavioural economics methodology

Popis výsledku anglicky

Many of behavioural economists have succumbed to misconception that economic models must be identified with observable reality. Therefore, behavioural approach enriches the sober neoclassical models with various psychological aspects of decision making in order to describe immediate reality more accurately. However, in contrast to natural sciences, social sciences aim at variance-based phenomena and thus the trade-off between theoretical objectiveness and empirical particularity remains. Behavioural insights are then at risk of being a mere fragmented empirical “evidence” of psychological descriptivism, which in combination with typical value neutrality should keep us vigilant about application in public policy. Secondly, the paper provides a progressive reading of rationality through a neoclassical lens. It is argued that rationality of a typical Bayesian decision-maker is immune to most of behavioural critique. It is shown on various examples that central behavioural concepts like satisficing behaviour or prospect theory cannot fundamentally challenge pillars of the neoclassical framework.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Quality & Quantity

ISSN

0033-5177

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

53

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

1743-1761

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85060202431