Dictatorship versus Manipulability Dilemma
The result's identifiers
Result code in IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11230%2F12%3A10295838" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11230/12:10295838 - isvavai.cz</a>
Result on the web
—
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
—
Alternative languages
Result language
angličtina
Original language name
Dictatorship versus Manipulability Dilemma
Original language description
By voting we mean the following pattern of collective choice: There is a set of alternatives and a group of individuals. Individual preferences over the alternatives are exogenously specified and are supposed to be orderings. The group is required to choose an alternative on the basis of stating and aggregating of individual preferences, or to produce a ranking of alternatives from the most preferred to the least preferred. In this paper concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation oftrue preferences) and dictatorship (voting procedure leads in all cases to social rankings that are identical with rankings of an individual) are investigated. The connection between Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability: there exists no voting procedure which satisfies at the same time non-dictatorship and non-manipulability.
Czech name
—
Czech description
—
Classification
Type
D - Article in proceedings
CEP classification
AH - Economics
OECD FORD branch
—
Result continuities
Project
<a href="/en/project/GA402%2F08%2F0501" target="_blank" >GA402/08/0501: Political Economy of Public Spending</a><br>
Continuities
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Others
Publication year
2012
Confidentiality
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Data specific for result type
Article name in the collection
Quantitative Methods in Economics: multiple criteria decision making XVI : proceedings of the International scientific conference
ISBN
978-80-225-3426-0
ISSN
—
e-ISSN
—
Number of pages
5
Pages from-to
226-230
Publisher name
Ekonóm
Place of publication
Bratislava
Event location
Bratislava
Event date
May 30, 2012
Type of event by nationality
WRD - Celosvětová akce
UT code for WoS article
000307520000039