Value perception in the ultimatum game: a blinded randomized trial

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00023752%3A_____%2F16%3A43915174" target="_blank" >RIV/00023752:_____/16:43915174 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/68407700:21230/16:00303024 RIV/26482789:_____/16:N0000060 RIV/00216208:11110/16:10332553 RIV/00064203:_____/16:10332553

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/6-2016" target="_blank" >http://www.ekonom.sav.sk/sk/casopis/rocnik/6-2016</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Value perception in the ultimatum game: a blinded randomized trial

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In a blinded, randomized Ultimatum game we study the decision rates using two different reward systems. We discuss the individual value perception and explain why we decided to test a non-monetary reward against the standard low stake monetary reward. We demonstrate that the value systems based on two different, inconvertible currencies lead to different decision rates in the same population. We provide the details of our single blind randomized protocol and discuss other protocol modifications designed to demonstrate the variability of the offer and/or response rates in the Ultimatum games. We provide our concept of rational, non-rational and irrational components contributing to the decision making process in different accord depending on the individual perception of the reward value and confront our experimental findings with the key assumptions provided by other authors.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Value perception in the ultimatum game: a blinded randomized trial

Popis výsledku anglicky

In a blinded, randomized Ultimatum game we study the decision rates using two different reward systems. We discuss the individual value perception and explain why we decided to test a non-monetary reward against the standard low stake monetary reward. We demonstrate that the value systems based on two different, inconvertible currencies lead to different decision rates in the same population. We provide the details of our single blind randomized protocol and discuss other protocol modifications designed to demonstrate the variability of the offer and/or response rates in the Ultimatum games. We provide our concept of rational, non-rational and irrational components contributing to the decision making process in different accord depending on the individual perception of the reward value and confront our experimental findings with the key assumptions provided by other authors.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Ekonomický časopis

ISSN

0013-3035

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

64

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

6

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

519-538

Kód UT WoS článku

000386537800002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85014323318