Why and how: The future of the central questions of consciousness

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00023752%3A_____%2F17%3A43918993" target="_blank" >RIV/00023752:_____/17:43918993 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11120/17:43915689

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01797/full" target="_blank" >https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01797/full</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01797" target="_blank" >10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01797</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Why and how: The future of the central questions of consciousness

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the “hard problem” of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem of consciousness will probably never completely disappear because it will always have its most committed supporters. However, there is a good chance that its weight and importance will be highly reduced by empirically tackling consciousness in the near future. We expect that future empirical endeavor of consciousness will be based on a unifying brain theory and will answer the question as to what is the function of conscious experience, which will in turn replace the implications of the hard problem. The candidate of such a unifying brain theory is predictive coding, which will have to explain both perceptual consciousness and conscious mind-wandering in order to become the truly unifying theory of brain functioning.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Why and how: The future of the central questions of consciousness

Popis výsledku anglicky

In this review, we deal with two central questions of consciousness how and why, and we outline their possible future development. The question how refers to the empirical endeavor to reveal the neural correlates and mechanisms that form consciousness. On the other hand, the question why generally refers to the “hard problem” of consciousness, which claims that empirical science will always fail to provide a satisfactory answer to the question why is there conscious experience at all. Unfortunately, the hard problem of consciousness will probably never completely disappear because it will always have its most committed supporters. However, there is a good chance that its weight and importance will be highly reduced by empirically tackling consciousness in the near future. We expect that future empirical endeavor of consciousness will be based on a unifying brain theory and will answer the question as to what is the function of conscious experience, which will in turn replace the implications of the hard problem. The candidate of such a unifying brain theory is predictive coding, which will have to explain both perceptual consciousness and conscious mind-wandering in order to become the truly unifying theory of brain functioning.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50103 - Cognitive sciences

Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Frontiers in Psychology

ISSN

1664-1078

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

8

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

Article Number: 1797

Stát vydavatele periodika

CH - Švýcarská konfederace

Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

1-9

Kód UT WoS článku

000412710700001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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